Geopolitic Projection of Iran after the Arab Spring.

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Degree work presented to opt for the title of
International Business Professional

Coach:

Dusan Praj

Magister in International Relations

Line of Research:

Geopolitics and International Relations

Esumer

International Studies Faculty

Medellín, Colombia

2019

Thanks to

We thank our families because without them we would not have been able to reach this point in our lives, for their constant support and understanding as well as their understanding of the sacrifices that were necessary throughout our development not only professional but also personal, we will be grateful and indebted to them for life.

To our professor since the beginning of this journey we call international business and now our advisor during the development of this work of degree, we thank you for instilling in us the concept of geopolitics and international relations, studies for which we both feel a great admiration, finally thank you very much for your great understanding and guidance during the development process of this work.

Valeria & Camila.

Abstract

The present final degree assignment is an investigation about the analysis and explanation of the geopolitical strategies used by the Islamic Republic of Iran when it comes to impose its influence and power in the middle east, as well as explaining how and the reasons why the Persian country applies these strategies in territories that are of great interest to Iran (Ex. Yemen, Irak and Syria). The project aims to provide a broader view on the problem that has been developing in the Middle East since 2011, known as the Arab Spring, as well as to how the Arab Spring has shaped and influenced on the performance and activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the international community and more specific in the Middle East.

The founding's from the research process for this final degree assignment is that the Islamic Republic of Iran through geopolitical strategies aspires to position itself as the Supreme leader of the Middle east, the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to meet the goal previously described by participating and having influence in different region of the Middle East with the help of different organization that support the Iranian system.

The main conclusion taken out of this investigation project is that the Islamic Republic of Iran through the development of the strategies and the achievement of the objectives shown in this project, wants to position itself as the leader of the middle east.

Key Word: Islamic Republic of Iran, Geopolitics, Arab Spring, Strategies, Middle East.

Table of contents

Illustration table.

Introduction

Since 2011 the situation in the Middle East has changed, due to the event of the Arab spring, which brought with it many problems for most of the countries of the region, Therefore, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and especially Iran have had to modify their foreign policy and geopolitical strategies in such a way that they can be projected and adapted to the existing problems in the region, such as the civil wars in countries such as Syria and Iraq. Iran is also presented before the international community, its dependence on the commercialization of crude oil to sustain its economy, in addition to the nuclear program it proposes to go as a leader of the Middle East region.

Within the state of the art of the present research work there are 8 different sources extracted in their totality from Google Scholar. From the analyses carried out during the process of realization of the state of the art, different key points were found for the development of the research, in the same way, it was possible to provide a broader context so that an understanding could be given about the influential factors in the proposed research topic.

This work aims to show Iran's geopolitical projection and its foreign policy strategies after the Arab spring and thus understand its positioning as a Middle Eastern leader, promoting Shiite power in the region, as well as seeking a way to have the power of the Mediterranean and thus have greater contact with the international community and have greater control of the Middle Eastern region.

The present work is presented in a research way, in order to understand and analyse the situation in the Middle East from 2011 with the event of the Arab spring to the present day, and thus be able to have a greater vision of the Muslim world.

1. Project Formulation

1.1   State of art.

In order to determine the current state, the most recent reports and possible solutions of the object of study, research was carried out in repositories of different Colombian and international universities, journalistic articles and reports of different purposes such as educational and critical. This research found that Esumer University has conducted research on the Middle East and the dynamics in the geopolitics of the region, which for the development of the problem is a source that could be very useful.

The following are some of the sources that are of vital importance for the development of research.

The article entitled: "Iran's geopolitical position in the Middle East" (Sariolghalam, 2015), in his first stay, analyses the way in which Iran's foreign policy focused on confronting the decisions taken by the West and how these would affect Iranian territory and sovereignty and in turn the relationship between those mentioned above. He also explains how Iran's foreign policy has had a broken continuity with respect to different territories such as the United States, Russia, Europe, its Arab neighbours and the Palestinian problem facing the Islamic republic. Equally important are the concepts of domestic policy, national security and geopolitics in the scenario of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution and the recognised Arab spring.

In other words, the article analyses Iran's foreign policy and the challenges it has faced over the years on the basis of concrete data and historical facts in a detailed manner.

This article allows the research to identify historical facts such as the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the war against Iraq, which are of great importance and influence on Iranian geopolitical policies and attitudes today, as well as giving context to many concepts that lacked clarity in certain instances.

However, with regard to the subject of the Arab spring, the article "From Spring to Autumn: Democracy "To The Arab"? - (Segal, 2011), presents information on the event that took place in the Arab world in 2010 -2013 better known as the Arab spring, which not only affected the countries directly involved in the conflict but also neighbouring countries and countries whose religious or commercial identity was linked to any of these countries, so that political, economic, social and geopolitical factors were damaged and suffered significant changes not only for the Arab world but also for the entire Middle East region.

For the analysis of the demonstrations in the Arab world, it is clear that there was a domino effect, which achieved that millions of people will reveal themselves against the corrupt and oppressive regime of the different governments in the region, which deprived their populations of the minimum welfare that a person needs to live, all this happened with the support of the West, to put an end to the injustices experienced by the population of the Middle East region.

It is necessary to study case by case, which are the characteristics of each country where there are popular uprisings. The tribal Libya of Gaddafi has enormous differences with Egypt, much more consolidated by the integration of its population to the republican idea, or with the unstable Yemen fragmented by a long civil war and Bahrain where the rivalry

of centuries of the branches of Sunni Islam and Shiite are determining in its internal conflict, or Jordan where the reformist king Abdallah II is extremely popular. (Segal, 2018)

Around the 17th century when the first Islamic Arab empire was created in the Middle East, which later expanded into North Africa, the Sunnis established the Umayyad empire (caliphate), these were followers of Abu bakr; on the other hand there are the Shiites who were followers of Ali began to have confrontations with the Sunnis by the power and mandate of the Caliphate; But the Shiites could not defeat the Sunites, as they always dominated the holiest and most sacred places of Islam: Mecca and Medina.

As the great majority of countries belonging to the Arab world and the Middle East have a Muslim religious ideology, this fact affected too much the entire Middle East region in terms of political and economic issues, as the protests caused the dismantling of

governments and civil wars so that the economy of the countries was disrupted, in addition all this developed a dynamism in the geopolitics of the region.

As the review of specialized literature progressed, the question arose about the role played by Iran in its area of influence, in that sense "Iran's New Role in the Middle East - Real Instituto Elcano" by (Mohammadi, 2012), provides a detailed view.

The purpose of this article is to present Iranian foreign policy and to show the role this country has in the Middle East region, having as its geopolitics the country Iran has a fundamental weight in the economy, religion and in the social part of the region.

Taking into account that Iran is a country whose geographical location is strategic and agitated, makes it one of the most important countries in the Middle East. Iran is located at the crossroads between East and West, it is also the only country that connects the Persian

Gulf and the Caspian Sea, which are two sites very rich in energy resources, is also close to the heart of Eurasia and is surrounded by about fifteen countries. Due to the fact that the region is quite agitated Iran has been in the middle of the three Gulf Wars, the war in Afghanistan, the situation in Western Asia and the situation in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, which allows to identify Iran as the country that has the most important role in the region, in addition Iran has been a fundamental factor for peace and stability in the region.

In addition to being a country whose geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economics situation is so important for the stability of the region, Iran's foreign policy has as a fundamental factor its values and identity. The Iranian identity refers to the tradition of interaction, thought and way of life that has existed since the beginning of the nation. This identity is the result of the interaction of civilization with Persian culture, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other. As an ancient nation, Iran has fought for about a century to achieve real independence and establish a political system based on a balance between its historical, traditional identity and the demands of modern government institutions

"The Iranian revolution has introduced a political system in which foreign policy decisions are made through a process of debate among various elites and governing bodies."

(Mohammadi, 2012), Due to the strategic political situation in the region and Iran's internal situation, it can be inferred that the principles of Iran's foreign policy, especially in view of the region, are multilateralism, confidence-building and capacity building in the region.

This leads to the question of Iran's geostrategic value, and one of the articles analysed deals with this issue:

Continuing with the state of the art Paloma González del Miño, in "La Competitividad Geoestratégica Irán-Arabia Saudí En Oriente Medio. Rivalry Between Regional Powers" (Gonzales del Miño, 2018), points out that the Arab spring was an event that gave way to a change that disrupted the established order in the Middle East for centuries, this was done through different dynamics that provoked significant changes in the politics, economy, society, geopolitics and military order of the countries of the region, leaving the great leaders of the region who are Iran and Saudi Arabia in search of balance and sustainability of the region, without losing the hegemony of power.

The deep crisis in the region, the product of a system of unstable power balances, is characterised by the emergence of new conflicts, various sources of confrontation, some visible and others underground, the balkanisation of security and the settlement of non-state actors. The geopolitical map, which is being redefined and restructured, is also conditioned by the power and influence struggle between the two central powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Irrespective of the armed conflicts that involve state decomposition and the fragmentation of territory (Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Daesh), what operates mostly is a new cold war of influences through political and economic support for certain political movements, armed groups and governments in the area. Therefore, what is at stake is the hierarchy of neighbourhood relations, quotas of influence and power and, therefore, regional leadership. (Gonzales del Miño, 2018)

Mainly, Iran and Saudi Arabia act by means of an antagonistic competitive duality in the internal order of the Middle East which, after the Arab Spring and the lesser commitment of the United States towards this area, play zero-sum games in the regional context and in open armed conflicts, and provoke state fragmentation, increased insecurity and extremely

significant figures in terms of the number of deaths and millions of displaced persons and refugees. The future of the region is conditioned by these conflicts, in addition to the actions of the two main regional powers with economic, political, cultural-ideological, energy and military capacities in a geostrategic competition that polarises the actions of other secondary actors. Likewise, the confessional division (Shiism-Sunism) serves as a cover for calculated opposition, as it is used to mitigate domestic threats and justify the legitimacy of regimes by means of a sectarian narrative that masks positions of power. (Gonzales del Miño, 2018)

As a complement, the research "Socio-political context: Iranian domestic policy and effects on its foreign policy" (Halliday, 2007), provides a contextualization of events in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran have shaped the country's domestic policy, which is reflected in foreign policies and how its geopolitics also drives the policies mentioned above.

In order to expand more than the article deals with, and as this one of great influence for the ongoing research work, it is necessary to talk about how events in the country's history, its deep-rooted religion, the nationalism of the population and the different external actors have shaped the policies and decisions taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As for historical antecedents, the article speaks of stages through which the country of the Middle East has passed until it becomes known as it is today, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as an example is mentioned the time in which Iran used to be an impero and as in this of its history also highlighted the struggle for international recognition with its enemy of that time Greece. As for the religious aspect, the article mentions how for decades the beliefs of

the country's prominent religion have been misinterpreted and put into great erroneous stereotypes, as the author describes it "radicalism and revolutionism at home and abroad - they are not precisely those that define most of the modern history of Shiism. In fact, for many periods and in several countries, the Shi'ite have been the most passive of the Muslims, and their leaders - Ayatollahs and others - the ones who most accepted and accommodated the state powers of their time. (Halliday, 2007)

The power of influence of the predominant religion in the Islamic Republic of Iran in both internal and external politics can be seen in what is known as the Shiite corridor, a subject that will be discussed in detail in the next chapters of the ongoing research work.

In conclusion, the previous analysis allows us to know and understand how the historical antecedents of Iran shape the perception that the world and the international community have of it and its actions, decisions and positions even when these are erroneous and do not fully explain the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article talks about how the stereotypes imposed by the world on Iran are not completely real and that because of its history Iran is not as it is today but that its decisions and positions are the cause of the same stereotypes imposed by the international community.

One issue that has aroused concern on the part of the international community, especially the Western powers, is the Iranian nuclear programme. Precisely the article entitled "Iranian nuclear programme: a technical vision" (Ortega, 2012), this one talks about how the Iranian nuclear program since its initial stages has been the object of the attentive glances of the international community especially of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Organization).

The Iranian nuclear program is based on the development of such energy for research purposes and totally peaceful in the same way, it mentions how the information gathered by the competent international organizations on the subject indicate that Iran's nuclear program not only seeks a use of energy for peaceful purposes and mostly for research but also shows Iran's great desire to belong and be part of the countries that have weapons based on this type of energy. It is implied that for Iran the acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean ensuring its security in the international community and at the same time being a great risk to its enemies within the same community. It is also made clear as Iran's desire for a nuclear weapon that does not run counter to the recognised Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which restricts the possession of nuclear weapons, to which Iran belongs.

The deduction is that what has been analyzed in previous pages regarding Iran's nuclear program helps the current research and development work because it provides a greater understanding of what drives Iran's decisions and for what purpose, in this case it would be treated as Iran's nuclear energy program and positions it vis-à-vis the leadership in the region. It is worth mentioning that its existence has not yet been confirmed, it would have the purpose of superimposing Iran in a very beneficial position in comparison with its neighbors in the Middle East and especially its opponents and in this way be able to fulfill its goal of becoming the leader of the region.

The seventh taken as a reference for the state of the art in progress is: "Iran and the Shiite arc" (Alvarez & Csabón, 2016). This article tells how Iran for the first time since the terrible Islamic revolution of 1979 has a foreign policy, which has allowed Iran to play its cards strategically in the Middle East region and obtain what is key for Iran to carry out one of its main geopolitical strategies; extend its influence through a Shiite Arch/Corridor.

Tragic situations in neighboring territories such as the US invasion of Iraq and then the fall of President Abdallah Saleh in Yemen, gave the Islamic Republic of Iran the opportunity to strengthen its connections with the population identified as Shia in the aforementioned territories (Iraq, Yemen), thus putting into action its ideal of the formation of a Shia corridor that goes from Iran through Iraq and Syria as Iran's main allies to Lebanon, where resides the largest military and political movement in the country which is supported by Iran, known as Hezbollah, a group that shares an objective with Iran, to confront Israeli movements in Yemen, Israel being Iran's enemy in the continuing quest for supremacy in the Middle East region and helping to expand both the Shiite corridor as well as carry out the export of the revolution, leading Iranian ideals to transcend borders.

The research in question provides the research work in development with a basis for understanding the concept of the Shi'ite Corridor or Shi'ite Arch and thus completing one of the objectives stipulated for the research.

Finally, in the line of human rights with respect to Iran, the article: "Middle East: transition, geopolitics and human rights in the beginning of the Arab spring" (Diaz Fernandez, 2012), shows and interprets the changes to which the Middle Eastern territories were subjected in

the periods before and after the Arab spring according to international definitions of rights and geopolitics. Although not all the territories involved or affected by this Arab spring are mentioned, if the article shows the domino effect that the actions of certain Middle Eastern countries had on the rest of the region.

 The similarities between the failed governments of the Middle East region and what those regions and their communities experienced in those moments of uncertainty are also

expressed through comparisons and in a very concrete way. It also gives a high relevance to the concepts of human rights violated by the governments in function in the Arab springtime.

Now, as a conclusion of the state of the art, it can be indicated that this allowed to broaden and to consolidate the knowledge that already exists in front of the subject, this way it was possible to offer more security to the subject and the line that one wants to investigate and thus to be able to give step to a process of investigation more fluid and clearer.

1.2   Problem Statement

In the last decade it has been witnessed that Iran as a possible leading state in the Middle East region has had to make modifications to its foreign policy and create geopolitical projections that are adapted to the problems and interests within the region. This is due to the lack of development in Iran's foreign policy and geopolitical affairs, the dependence on oil trading for the stability of the country's economy, the interregional conflict, the threats to sovereignty and the economic sanctions imposed by states outside the region.

Undoubtedly, many of these problems arose after the Arab spring, an event that affected the entire Middle East region, somehow the Iranian state benefited from this fact as it was able to implement more of its influence as a power in the region and try to expand the Shiite empire. Likewise, the sanctions imposed by countries outside Iran were due to its development of the nuclear energy programmer that threatened the international community. At the same time, the state's overproduction of oil creates its economic dependence on the commercialization of crude oil in the region and in countries outside the region.

At the same time, these problems experienced by the Iranian state on a daily basis may lose their influence in the Middle East region, their relevance in the international markets more specifically in the commercialization of oil and its derivatives, which would seriously affect the Iranian economy.

To avoid the aforementioned, strategies must be developed to promote the geopolitical development of Iran, in such a way that it helps to increase its influence in the Middle East region, consequently, Iranian foreign policy will have an improvement in the development of diplomatic relations with other countries in the region and keep La Paz within it. In addition to creating trade and diplomatic relations with the international community.

The research question on the basis of which the development of the research project will be structured is:

How does the Islamic Republic of Iran implement foreign policy strategies to develop its geopolitical projection from the Arab spring onwards?

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 General objective

nalyze the geopolitical projection strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the Arab spring through its foreign policy.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- Analyze the function of the strategy of the Chiita corridor or arch in the geopolitical projection of Iran after the Arab spring.

- Determine the influence and export of the Islamic revolution by Iran in the countries of the Middle East region.

- To analyze the factors for which the leadership of the Middle East region is disputed, between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran.

1.4   Justification

1.4.1 Teoric Justification

The research project on the geopolitical projection of Iran after the Arab spring contributes to a line of research on the subject, which is identified as Iran's external studies, international relations, foreign policy and geopolitics.

Once this closing research can be of great help to researchers who wish to expand the topic or give a continuation to it because this project expanded the state of the art on works in the same line of research. It is worth mentioning that in the future the research may also serve other researchers who are looking for extra information or who require context on the subject and how this influences certain decisions made or that are in process of implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore in its research topic, either a continuation as previously mentioned a different research topic.

1.4.2 Social and/or Bussines justication

This research project may be of help to the international relations sector, as it gives context to the behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of its geopolitical and foreign policy projection.

1.4.3 Personal Justification

This project offers its researchers the opportunity to broaden, strengthen and deepen the knowledge initiated throughout their professional careers on geopolitical issues, foreign policy and international relations of the states, in this case the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the same way, it is a bridge for possible lines of work of the researchers in the future.

1.5   Referencial Framework

1.5.1 Theorical Framework

Next, the theories that sustain this degree work are presented, the generalities of the theory are explained, as well as the way in which the theory is applied and associated with the research project in question. Theories will be presented from major to minor. Consequently, the theories that support the degree work are the following:

Geopolitics of Nicholas Spykman

In this theory the author unites the concepts of "heartland-Halford Jhon Makinder" and his own "rimland", he connects them in such a way that it is understood that for a State it is not only important to control the center (heart) of the territory but also that it is of great importance to encircle that heart with the territories of the surroundings as well as to affirm that the foreign policy of a State is based and revolves around the acquisition of power, this is achieved in an aggressive not defensive way.

From the above, the author comes to what is known as "the condition of States", this concept reveals the reason why a State exists or is maintained, which would be for its own strength or for the protection of a State of great strength. It also provides clarity on how those powerful states use those under their protection as their buffer.

The author assures that the world is divided in 6 zones, which vary from autonomous power or have function to be the buffer for the power zones.

This theory provides the current research project with context and clarity on how the Iranian state establishes its geopolitical strategies based on the combination of Nicholas Spykman's concepts known as the "heartland" and "rimland", and with them, achieve the so-called Shiite corridor, which will give it not only recognition in the international community but the republic will also be able to establish itself as the leader and strongest state in the Middle East region, thus leaving aside its title of buffer of autonomous states.

The contributions of one of the fathers of geopolitics, Nicholas Spykman, who completes the concept of Halford Mackinder to unite in this way the concepts of "heartland" by his

predecessor and his own creation "rimland", implying that for a state to maintain its autonomy, power and influence in the world, whether in emergency conditions or the opposite, the containment of external forces by means of the "rimland" is necessary, in other words the one who controls the coastlines of a state will be able to protect his heart (heartland) and will also be able to expand his influence to other territories.

"he who dominates the Rimland, dominates the world - Nicholas Skypman"

This is possible through the method of "dual counting" as well as the "containment policy" strategies which were built on the basis of the concepts mentioned above. Both strategies, especially the dual count, were used by the United States towards Iran at different points in the history of the Islamic country.

Neorealism

Throughout history many theorists have devoted themselves to studying through neo-realist theory, the creation and development of institutions after World War II, such as empires, alliances, global norms and international economic social systems throughout history. Neorealism or structural realism was born as a school of thought that focuses on the utilitarian of social action. For the explanation of the behaviors of the State and the institutions of a country, offensive and defensive neoclassical approaches have arisen, which allow the international community to deduce what kind of approach or relationship it should handle with the country in custody, then the purpose of the aforementioned approaches will be explained.

"According to Lieber, offensive realism is called technological opportunism. Lieber's perspective is that technology is implemented by states to pursue their policies. States do not see the development of new technologies as a means to preserve the status quo or to signal benevolent intentions, but as potential opportunities to gain political and military advantage over rivals. In defensive realism, survival calculations in an anarchic system can guide states to moderate their behaviour and cooperate. Offensive realism claims that

survival calculations in an anarchic system inevitably lead to aggression and expansionism. (Vargas Hernández, 2009)

According to liberalism human rationality is the solution to fallibility and human desire for power, making it more tolerant of radical and drastic reforms. The neo-realist conceptions of institutions consider that these are functional needs to generate order. For neo-realists, institutions are reflections of the power of the State and the relative distribution of its capacities, which makes them linked to the interests of the State in the first place and by virtue of it to the structure of the anarchy of international systems. (Vargas Hernández, 2009)

This theory brings to the research project the clarity of how the Iranian state should take a position vis-à-vis the international community as well as how power is managed within the state and the country's institutions. In addition, as a principal leader of the Middle East region he must implement the concepts of offensive and defensive realism in his foreign policy in such a way that he is a Country prepared for any movement both in the region and in the international arena.

Theorist Kenneth Waltz defines neorealism as the evolution of political realism, where the international system breaks with the principles of classical realism and explains that relations between states are fundamental to create an international society, and they also consider that anarchies limit the actions of the State.

In order to continue the conceptual framework, the explanation of an important concept for the research project begins, which is foreign policy, from the vision of the previously mentioned Nicholas Skypman, who mentions that, in order to define the foreign policy of a state, it is necessary to have knowledge about the geography of the territory, as well as to take a correct role and at the right time within international policies.

Skypman in his writings exposes the following thought on the foreign policy of the states:

"This means that the struggle for power is identified with the struggle for survival, and therefore, the improvement of relative positions of power becomes the primordial design of the internal and foreign policy of the states..." (Peritore, 2010)

This allows us to see that in order for a state like the republic of Iran to acquire the desired power, it must not only reform its internal policies, but also take advantage of its territorial

position in the Middle East and through being able to face enemies as well as expand its influence in order to fulfill its foreign policy objectives.

1.5.2 Concept Framework

The concepts that will be dealt with in this research project are the following:

Arab Spring: This is the name given to the demonstrations that took place between 2011 2013 in different Arab countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Bahrain. The causes of these demonstrations are transferred to "the consequences of the economic crisis and its impact on a region that has practically placed its economic trust in oil and therefore united with the US and European economies" (Amnistia Internacional, 2018)

Theocracy: When a Country bases its laws, regulations and restrictions on a specific religion as well as on its god or deity. "It is said that this type of government operates under divine rule, in other words, the deity is recognized as Head of State. (Anonimo, 2018)

As for the sacred book, it is treated as a direct message from the deity and has as its main objective to serve as the strict guidelines of the society that follows religion. The leaders of a state based on a theocracy are usually religious figures who take the position of political authority in the name of the deity, this political authority has the job of interpreting the verses of the sacred book and applying them to the politics of that specific state without leaving aside the affirmation that they are following the guidelines stipulated by the deity and are in favor of the will of the deity.

Wilayat Faqih: According to (Al-Islam.org, 2018) "derived from the word wila' means power, authority or a right of a certain kind. In Shi 'a theology, wilayat is the authority vested in the Prophet and Ahlul Bayt as representatives of Almighty God on this earth.

Shiite: Person who is a supporter or follower of Ali ibn Abi Tálib, successor of Muhammad.

Shiite Corridor/Arc: The line of groups supported by Iran who identify with ideologies and religion from Iran through to Iran is known as the Shiite Corridor or Arch by Iraq and

religión desde Irán pasando por Irak and Syria as Iran's main allies to Lebanon where Iran's largest Iranian-backed military force, known as Hezbollah, resides.

Hezbollah[1]: : According to the article "Who is Hezbollah?", it is a Shi'ite military group that emerged with the financial support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, after the civil war in Lebanon, which took place between 1975-1990. Hezbollah aims to attack Israeli forces not only in the Middle East but also in other regions where the Israeli armed forces are located. After the end of the Iraq war in 2003, Iran used the knowledge of the insurgent group to train its Shiite military forces. The article also mentions the presence of Hezbollah in countries such as Yemen, where Hezbollah helps the insurgent group Huties, which will be discussed later, the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad has also received constant support from Hezbollah in its military conflict in Syria that takes place from 2011 and that still continues (Van Camp, 2009)

Hamas[2]: Palestinian military group fighting against Israeli advances and occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This military group also has a political branch, which is responsible for building schools, hospitals and providing support to the population on religious and / or social issues (BBC World, 2014)

Iman: Person who leads the collective prayer of Islam.

Ulema: Community of legal students of Islam and the Shari'a. He also defines himself as a Doctor in Muslim religious and legal disciplines.

Ayatollah: The word is an Arabic expression meaning "Sign of Wing or Sign of God". This term represents one of the highest denominations within the Shi'ite priesthood. People with this title are respected figures and experts in the study of Islamic science, to mention a few have philosophy, morals, enlightening knowledge and legislation.

Baaz : Also known as Socialist Ba'ath Party, it refers to the political party founded by Saddam Hussein, Michel Aflaq, Zaki Al-Arsuzi and Salh Bitar in Syria in 1947, the ideology of this party was then put into practice in Iraq by the hand of Saddam Hussein as

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[1] The translation of the word Hezbollah is "God's Party".
[2] The name Hamas means: Islamic Resistance Movement.

president of the country. The Ba'ath socialist party is not limited to a single country, there is also the presence of this party in other parts of the Middle East, even so, the stronger

presence of this in countries like Syria and Iraq (where it currently plays the role of guerrilla).

Zaidism: A branch of Shiism within Islam, one of its main followers is the Yemeni insurgent group known as Huties.

Although a branch closer to Sunni than to Iranian Shia, since the origins of the Huties group, they have shown an ideology based on the following slogan; "Death to America, Death to Israel, Victory of Islam", which connects with the ideologies, policies and strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which to mention one is; to eradicate the presence and military and political advances by the U.S. and Israel in the region. (Tolosa Igualada, 2017)

Jihadism: Jihadism: The word refers to the ideology that is understood by a minority within the Islamist movement, which uses violence in order to build the perfect Islamic state.

The term is used to identify the most radical and violent groups within political Islam, which have the peculiarity of using constant violence hand in hand with terrorist activities in order to fulfill the rigorous religious obligation known as Jihad[3].

Dual Containment: Policy adopted by the United States in 1993, under the mandate of President William Clinton, with which the American country planned to contain two strong countries in the Middle East, Iran and Iraq, in order to protect American interests in the region because Arab countries were a threat to those interests.

The main objective declared by the United States and its strategy of dual containment in Iran, was to apply sufficient diplomatic and economic pressure on the Arab country for the latter's government to open the way for the modification of its action in 5 specific areas; The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, the internal political dissidence of the Arab

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[3] They have two inclinations which are in the first stay the lesser Jihad, within which one tends to the use of cruelty and aggression and in the second instance one has the greater Jihad, which relies on spiritual interpretation referring to all believers of the ideology must strive to be better Muslims.

country, and so on The country's support for international terrorist groups, its efforts to destabilize governments in the Middle East and finally the Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process. Although many U.S. allies supported the containment of Iraq, when it came to Iran's containment, many of these U.S. allies opposed confronting Iran. (Gause, 1994)

After 1997, officials from the United States of America put an end to the use of Dual Containment as a strategy, and opened the way to negotiations with Iran through dialogue.. (Encyclopedia.com, 2019)

1.5.3 Methodological Framework

1.5.4 Investigation Method

- **Research Approach**

The focus of this research is purely qualitative because the information base used in this research comes from sources such as: scientific journal articles, written reports from official bodies, and other sources.

- **Type of study**

The type of study of the project in question is clearly applied research, because no new knowledge or theories are being generated.

Knowing that it is an applied research, it is clarified that the level of depth of the research is explanatory because the variables that affect the development of the geopolitical projection of the Islamic Republic of Iran are being identified and analyzed.

1.5.5 Research Method

The research methodology will be used to explain the objective as well as to contextualize this research project using the different sources of information that are currently available and which will be discussed more specifically in the next items.

- **Data collection techniques and tools**

The collection of information from this research project will be carried out first hand via the web. The necessary information for the research will be extracted through the different scientific databases of the world such as: Google scholar, scielo and redalyc, as well as

from globally recognized university institutions and official governmental and non-governmental entities.

From the previous search you will find official information, scientific articles, theories, policies and reports that help to broaden, contextualize and provide clarity to the focal points of the topic in question.

- **Information selection and analysis**

The information needed for the project will be selected by qualitative methods, more specifically, the information will be extracted from texts, scientific journals, books, press, laws, videos and images that have a direct relationship with the object of study. It is worth mentioning that the information used is related in a cohesive way.

- **Bias control**

The use of reliable information is guaranteed, which comes from recognized sources that assure true and variable information, in the same way it is assured that the results found in the research project in question will not be manipulated in any way, this information will be treated with high respect for its results. Bearing in mind the difference in culture, it is guaranteed that the research will be free of value judgments for the different topics dealt with throughout the research

2. Research development

2.1 Shiite pathway as a geopolitical strategy of Iran.

The strategy of the Shiite corridor or arch in the geopolitical projection of Iran to understand this strategy one must take into account the history and know the political and religious ideologies of the Shiites and Sunnis, and thus understand how this strategy of creating a Shiite corridor brings a benefit to the foreign policy and geopolitical projection of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Shiites and Sunnites are the two Islamic conglomerates, bringing together the largest number of believers on the world scale. The division between Sunni and Shiite occurred after the death of Muhammad, at the time of the first orthodox caliph (prophet), this event was called the first "fitna" (division). (Bossa, 2011)

The history of the division of these two religious branches begins when the prophet dies in 632, the year in which the initial fissures in the religious group that until then was only one begin to show.

It is said in history that Muhammad had a certain favoritism for his nephew and son-in-law Ali, this was not chosen successor because of his young age, instead were positioned as successors of Muhammad the so-called Orthodox caliphs (name assigned to the first 4 successors of Muhammad from 632 to 661) Abu Omar and Othman successively. This decision was not well received throughout the then Islamic empire and led Muawiya to proclaim himself as governor of Syria. The decision also led to different conflicts within the Islamic empire that ended in a 5-year long civil war. It is important to note that this civil war was ended by an arbitration pact between the contributing parties to that war. The supporters since then were recognized in two different ways; the followers of Muawiya began to be recognized as Sunnites because they followed the guidelines of Sunna and by another Loa followers of Ali became known as Shiites.

Mainly the conflict between Muawiya and Ali was a territorial rivalry, and derived from different ideologies of society. Muawiya believed that society should be inclusive, not only accepting Arabs but also accepting Jews, Persians, or Kurds, and Ali's model molded itself into a society created by Arabs guided by leadership, but over time these differences became involved in ideological and political issues.

The strengthening of the Umayyad dynasty, the seat of the caliphate, was established in Damascus. After this, the Sunni leaders reflected on a real dilemma, since they had to choose between whether it was more important to heed the Koran's call to form an egalitarian society or whether, on the contrary, they had to give priority to consolidating the new empire. They began to support the agrarian-based society, which began to create differences between the rulers and the people who are plunged into poverty. The Umayyad dynasty did not have an absolute monarchy, since Muawiya ruled as an Arab chief, and for the Arabs royalty was not feasible and generated distrust when it came to having power.

The worst days of the Muslim empire came, leaving aside the political and religious criteria that characterized Arab society, Muawiya died when he left his succession to his son Yazid

I. What made the Shiites, who had maintained a stable relationship with the Sunnis, react to this. The Shiites aware of the inferiority they had against the Sunnis decided to face Yazid I in order to repair the honor of Islam, the Shiites came out with their small army destroyed from that battle, which was a great humiliation and thus was born the "second fitna" or division.

After this event the differences between the Shiites and the Sunnis expanded throughout the stories, the Sunnis on the one hand become the official line, located in Damascus, and then with the Abbasid Dynasty are located in Baghdad, on the other hand the Shiites are confined in the Medina, and begin to come into contact with other cultures and practice with their sects a more esoteric Muslim cult, thus within Shiism begin with ideologies that evolve to the conceptual such as transmigration of souls and the divine incarnation of the Caliph in magnets.

The Sunnites after the power dispute between Baghdad and the Caliphs created a doctrine denial mechanism to prevent the power of the imams could overcome that of the Sunni caliphs.

In its early stages the doctrine of concealment for the Shiites was the means to reach an agreement with the reality of Sunni power, in that period the Shiites chose to handle a quiet policy and thus be able to reach an agreement with the Sunnis. At that time it was believed that any ruler with discipline would be accepted in the absence of Imam, this ended up becoming a "double-edged sword. In times of high and uncontrollable hostility between the political leaders and the Shia population, mentions have arisen about the illegitimacy of the temporary governments, assuring that the Ulema was better qualified and was more apt than a temporary ruler to interpret and transmit the will of the Imam and therefore his political objectives were superior.

This struggle between Shiites and Sunni affect different countries, between those Iran whose government is composed of Shiite descendants, because of these ideological differences, Iran has been involved in different conflicts with neighbors in the Middle East, these conflicts have led to wars over territories such as the conflicts in Yemen, Iraq and

Syria, which will be discussed below and what is the objective of Iran with its participation in these conflicts and how this helps the construction of the Shiite corridor.

2.1.1 Participation of Iran in the conflict of Syria.

After starting the great revolution in the whole Middle East region known as Arab Spring, and the big protests of the revolutionary groups in Tunisia, Egypt and the beginning of the rebellion in Libya in 2011, protests broke out against Bashar Al-Asad, Syrian president, who was the representative of the Ba'ath party. So, in 2011 with the Arab Spring, the protests in Syria broke out, due to the arrest and torture of some young people who painted on the wall of their school "It's your turn, doctor", referring to Bashar, who has studies in medicine. (Alba, 2018)

Opposition groups to the Ba'ath party were formed, which with the economic and military support provided by the Western powers the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as with the support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, through the delivery of weapons and economic aid, where Turkey provides a logistical base at the border to rebel organizations that are against the government of Bashar Al-Asad, managed to become armed groups, also began defections of Syrian military to join the rebels.... (Ghotme, Garzón, & Cifuentes Ortiz, 2013)

"As a result the country was plunged into a civil war, where the bombings multiplied, reaching multiple battles capital, Damascus and Aleppo which is the second city of the country." (Alba, 2018) The causes of the civil war range from a systematic campaign of repression of decades by the regime, to religious, ethnic and economic factors.

Until mid-2012, the rebels were defeating the government and the end of Bashar Al-Asad's regime was approaching, but then he sought help from his allies. The first ally was Iran since Iran had foreign policy strategies and interests in this conflict, also the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah, who sent their militias to fight by the hand of Asad, Iran mobilized the (Shiite) militias of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard, trained and supported the forces of the regime and saved it almost from sinking at that moment.

Iran has maintained privileged relations with Syria since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, such as the proportion of oil at very low prices and even free of charge, as well as strengthening its economic-financial, military, cultural, industrial and especially security ties. At that time Syria was a country with a Sunni majority led by an Alaouite minority, that is to say, a Shiite minority, which gave Iran great support during the war with Iraq that took place between 1980 and 1988.

The most important factors of Iran's unwavering support for the Syrian regime are Syria's intermediary role between Iran and Hezbollah, the political balance in the region, the will to curb American and Israeli interests in the region. For all these reasons, Iran is the Syrian regime's greatest support. (Arefi, 2016)

Iran, with the backing of the agreement between the major powers on the nuclear programme, is a major player in the conflict in Syria, where, together with Russia, it gives great support to the regime of Bashar Al-Asad, for the aforementioned reasons.

Russia has managed to keep Asad in power, and its intervention, together with that of Iran, the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah and various Shia militias, has been key to decanting the course of the war. In September 2018, seven and a half years after the conflict began, the Damascus regime controls at least 60% of Syria. (Alba, 2016)

If Iran remains the only major power supporting the Russians in Syria, it would seem that, in the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, with Russia on the Shiites' side and the Sunnis' west. (mundo, 2015)

It should be pointed out that Syria has strategic advantages for Iran, such as the opening of a great door to the Arab world; the erection of a wall in front of Israel and the United States. But the most important aspect of this relationship is the construction of a solid bridge linking Iran to Lebanon and Hezbollah. (Arefi, 2016)

In order to continue with the conflicts in which Iran seeks a benefit, the review and analysis of the conflict in Iraq and the participation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the same is given way.

2.1.2 Participation of Iran in the conflict of Irak.

Iran has a particular interest for its geopolitical projection, it tackles the invasion of the United States into Iraq and then opens the way to the reasons why and how the Islamic Republic of Iran got involved in the conflict as well as creating diplomatic relations with its former enemy Iraq.

2.1.2.1.1   United States of America Invades Irak.

The invasion of Iraq by the United States (under George W. Bush) began in 2003 when Saddam Hussein had the mandate of that country, with the excuse of promoting the suppression of terrorism that was taking more and more force in the region, which also affected security and filled with concern the international community, especially the United States after it suffered the effects of a terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 with the fall of the Twin Towers. In addition, the American government assured that there were strong connections between President Saddam Hussein and the terrorist group Al Qaeda. (Council on Foreing Relations, 2011)

The real objective of the US in invading Iraq was the presumed search for weapons of mass destruction and ending them, given that they were an imminent threat to the US and its allies, according to Brian Michael Jenkins (Senior Advisor to RAND). On the other hand, the Western country was looking for the creation of a government in Iraq that would be guided by the guidelines established by them, as well as responding to their interests and being their ally in the region in order to strengthen their geopolitical dominance in the region. (Jenkins, 2013)

Among the repercussions of the US invasion of Iraq are heavy damage to the country's infrastructure, high numbers of deaths. In October 2013, the journal PLoS Medicine published a study conducted by Amy Hagopian and others, in which it states that the total number of deaths during the invasion of Iraq amounted to 460,800 people. (Hagopian, y otros, 2013)

There were also large movements of Iraqi people to foreign countries, fleeing the armed conflict in their native country, "According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the number of displaced persons is 4.7 million. The creation of new terrorist insurgent groups such as the Islamic State was also one of the repercussions of the invasion. (Observatori.org, 2019)

During the US invasion of Iraq President Saddam Hussein was captured in 2003 and after being imprisoned for three years he was sentenced to death in 2006. Iraq did not have a properly established government from the capture of Saddam until 2010, when the first democratic elections were held in Iraq, which were dominated by the Shia majority and Nuri al Maliki (Shia) was represented as prime minister. The latter opened Iran's doors to strengthen ties with Iraq's Shiite population and thus carry out its Shiite arch or corridor strategy. (Barzegar, 2017)

2.1.2.1.2 Iran's Part in the conflict of Irak.

One of the reasons why Iran became involved in the Iraq conflict after the March 2010 elections was that the republic does not want instability in Iraq since it did not want to have American bases near its border, which a year later i.e. in 2011 left Iraqi territory, thus Iran was able to more freely develop its strategy of the Shia corridor or arch with greater fluidity, since the president of Iraq is Shia and this allows Iran to have a better relationship with this country. (Chislett, 2006)

Iran is an important country for Iraq's progress and development both politically and economically, so the Iraqi authorities and government are striving to have much stronger

bilateral relations and to bring Shia power around the region, as well as having greater access to the Mediterranean. Both governments created a free trade zone to promote the economic sector and thus increase trade participation in the region and decrease its economic dependence on the United States.

During the government of Nuri Al Maliki (2010-2018) Chiita, it was the time when relations between Iran and Iraq were most entrenched due to the fact that the government for decades identified with Iran's interests and ideologies, due to the fact that both governments identified with the Shia religion.

It is of great importance to point out that, although the current Iraqi president (Barham Salih) is Sunita, the political relations between the Iranian and Iraqi governments have been maintained, the Iraqi president Barham Salih has defended Iran on many occasions against the accusations and pressures of the United States and has shown himself to be Iran's ally supporting its ideology of a Shiite corridor to reach control of the Mediterranean, has also allowed Iran to take its troops to Iraqi territory to reach Syria directly and there to fight hand in hand with Iran to maintain the Sirius Shi'i power, and has also provided diplomatic support for the internal conflicts in the Middle East region. (PBS, 2019)

From the above it can be mentioned that the economic and political relations of both countries are strengthening every day more, this can be evidenced in the visit made by Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdel-Mahdi to Iran (under Hasan Rohani mandate) earlier this year, in that visit both leaders said in a press conference "..., Rohaní stressed that both countries seek to increase economic ties to "achieve a trade volume of $20 billion in the coming months". (EFE, 2019)

One of the ways in which Iran has become involved in Iraqi territory is by supporting the government in building infrastructure between the two countries, such as the railway between Shalamcheh in Iran and Basra in Iraq. (EFE, 2019)

Based on this, it can be analyzed that this railway line helps Iran with the mobilization of not only administrative factors and the population in general, but that the same line could also be used for the movement of military personnel and armament between the two countries.

Iran by supporting the Iraqi economy as well as its continued support for the eradication of the presence of the jihadist group known as the Islamic State not only strengthens relations between the two nations, but also gives it an ally of great importance for the connection of the Shia corridor or arch in the region.

2.1.3 Irán-Hezbollah:

Within Iran's interests with the support it offers Hezbollah, there is in the first instance the need on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran to confront the military advances on the part of its adversaries, in this specific case Israel, but it does not have the capacity to attack them directly, this leads Iran to be dependent on the military movement Hezbollah to face Israeli advances and to be able to dissuade the attacks of these. As Iran's second interest with Hezbollah, it is the possibility that this support will give Iran a powerful and notorious voice of authority in regional affairs, which connects with Iran's support for Hezbollah also intends to bring down the high violation or better, discrimination and oppression that is done to the Shiite population by the Sunnis throughout the region. (DeVore, 2012)

To speak specifically about Hezbollah in Lebanon, the following information must be taken into account, according to the global firepower 2019 (global firepower index) the military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran occupy the 14th place of a list of 136 countries, which makes them the country with the best and greatest military force in the region (Middle East) after Turkey, Iran's successors on the list, Israel and Saudi Arabia, which are ranked 17th and 25th respectively, this military power and high numbers of armistice allows the Islamic Republic of Iran not only to lend its military strength to support insurgent groups like Hezbollah but also to provide training to the group's recruits. (Global Firepower)

Another way in which Iran supports this insurgent group is through military and war support, as mentioned earlier, according to Gustavo Sierra, a specialist for Infobae America, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided Hezbollah with a total of $300 million annually for the creation of the organization as well as sophisticated weapons designed in Tehran, which demonstrates the high degree of interest on the part of Iran will go to the group from its inception and how Iran from the founding of the organization envisioned

how Hezbollah could help Hezbollah meet its goals both at the time and in the future. (Sierra, 2019)

According to José María Navarro Blanco, Security Analyst for the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, The Islamic Republic of Iran currently provides the insurgent group Hezbollah with approximately 100 to 200 million dollars a year for the group to continue with its organizational movements in the Middle East, more specifically for the fulfillment of its main objective, which is to retain and counteract Israeli advances and attacks as well as those of any other external state that is not an ally of the group or of Iran. Donations from sources that support both the group's and Iran's movements from Latin America, the United States, Europe and West Africa are also of great help in strengthening the cause. (Blanco Navarro, 2015)

Hezbollah does not reveal the number of personnel they have, but their numbers are great stipulations, in 2017 the Jane's information Group evaluated the insurgent group Hezbollah, that evaluation yielded an estimated 25,000 active men for combat within the insurgent group and about 30,000 in reserve, all financed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. (Jane's Information Group, 2017)

Hezbollah's power is also based on the number of weapons they possess, with approximately 100,000 to 120,000 long-range rockets aimed at countering and attacking their main enemy, Israel. Hezbollah's attack strategy combines rockets, light infantry and anti-armour units in a way that allows them to defend the group's position and interests in Lebanese territory. (Sancha, 2018)

On the other hand, Hezbollah has limited quantities of anti-aircraft missiles, anti-vessel missiles and anti-tank missiles, in the latter (anti-tank missiles) Hezbollah has one of the best results. Hezbollah has no manned aircraft, tanks or armoured vehicles in Lebanon, but it does have this type of weaponry on Syrian territory. (Shaikh & Williams, 2018)

The financial and military support offered by Hezbollah to the population under its protection provides an opportunity for the group in the name of Iran to win the hearts and minds of the population, because the group with the economic funds provided by Iran also opens the opportunity to carry out activities for society as mentioned in the article

Hezbollah, Hezbollah [...] competes for the loyalty of its Shiite components through an extensive network of schools, clinics, youth programs, private businesses, and local security. (Blanco Navarro, 2015)

Iran also supports the insurgent group by providing sanctuary and political support for members of the group who need it. Iran's support of the group allows Hezbollah to have a long-term budget which in turn allows them to campaign with well-structured strategies with a long-range reach in the region, thus taking a further step towards building and strengthening the Shi'ite Corridor.

The Islamic Republic of Iran's continued support of Hezbollah in the aspects mentioned above not only allows it to continue its fight against Israeli advances, but also ensures a strong ally with a strategic position that allows it to expand its influence and complete the construction of the Shiite corridor.

Iran's strategy in relation to the internal conflicts in the Middle East region is to strengthen itself as a powerful country, and its main strategy is to form a Shiite corridor so that the Shiites control the Middle East.

Its main strategic objective is to establish a land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean, through the Shiite regions of Iraq, which would give the Islamic Republic direct access to its allies in Syria and Lebanon.

This corridor will facilitate the movement of military forces between Iran, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and in this way also increases the flow of arms to Damascus and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah which are key players in the creation of such a corridor.

Illustration 1 *Chii influence arch.* **From***: (Venzala, 2018)*

In pursuit of Tehran's great goal, thousands of pro-Iranian fighters deployed in Syria's central region are advancing eastward[4], and although the land route is not yet a fait, Iranian forces have progressed on both sides of the border as they seize territory from the Islamic state.

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[4] Reference to one of the cardinals points (North, South, East, and West).

2.2 Iran's Influence and export of the islamic revolution in the middle east.

This chapter recounts how the Islamic Republic of Iran expands its influence and exports the revolution over the Middle East region through military, economic and in some cases humanitarian support to different insurgent groups and Middle Eastern society, it is of great importance that Iran not only supports insurgent groups, but also provides support to leaders who support and support Iran's objectives.

It should be stressed that the Islamic Republic of Iran offers its influence in the region through what is known as the "axis of resistance", this strategy when with external factors which help to achieve that axis, these actors are the Syrian regime, Hezbollah in Lebanon (discussed in previous chapters), the Hamas insurgent group, the relationship with Muqtada Al Sadr and his army Al Mahdi are also a factor in the fulfillment of the axis, the Huties insurgent group in Yemen, like the proxie allies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Soage, Instituto Español de Estudios Estrategicos, 2018)

Next, the relationship of the Islamic Republic of Iran with allied groups and leaders in the region is reviewed and analyzed, and how Iran expands its influence and exports the revolution in the Middle East.

2.2.1 Irán-Yemen the case of Huties.

It then explains and provides context for one of the conflicts considered one of the most bloodthirsty and anti-human rights conflicts by organisations such as the UN and UNHCR, with approximately 4,800 civilians killed or injured in the country, one-fifth of whom are children. Similarly, data from UNHCR explains that 15% of the population (around 4.3 million people) have been forced to flee their homes in Yemen. (ACNUR, 2019)

The civil war mentioned above is known as the Yemeni Civil War. This war began with a series of popular protests in 2011, thus making part of the well-known Arab Spring, against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had the mandate of Yemen for 33 years until he was forced to leave his position due to accusations of corruption in addition to an endless conflict with the insurgent group Huties whose members follow Zaidism[5]. (Avilés Farré, 2015)

After President Saleh was overthrown, Yemen's mandate came under the then vice-president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who opened the way for two long years of failed national consultations on national transition, governance, structure and reform of the Yemeni state, all under the national dialogue conference. (Schmitz, 2015)

The conference presented the Yemeni population with a new map, showing a Yemen divided into regions, but which did not take into account socio-economic or regional claims regarding the distribution of natural resources, commercial as well as agricultural areas, port access was also a factor that was not taken into account by the conference and ultimately led to little support from the Yemeni population and strong opposition from the Huties. In 2014 as a result of the little success of the national dialogue conference the insurgent group managed to acquire the support of the Shia minority present on Yemeni territory, as well as the takeover of the governorate of Saada, population in northeastern Yemen as well as the capital Sanah. After the seizure of the capital at the beginning of 2015, the president of that moment, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and his city council were forced to flee the country. The latter retaliated against the Huties by requesting assistance from third countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which formed a coalition aimed at establishing a government that would be recognized by the international community. (International Amnesty, 2018)

It is at this point that the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the conflict in Yemen, specifically its support for the Huties, gains strength and solidifies actively, through the increase in ballistic supplies (weapons, missiles), military training by Iranian militias and Hezbollah, another strong ally of Iran towards the Huties, also increased. (Mizrahi, 2019)

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[5] Definition in the conceptual framework.

This connects with the fact that the Huties insurgent group has possession of Scub-B and Scub-Cla class missiles, which are the variation of the North Korean missiles known as Hawsong, the Huties group also has missiles like the Tochka, the Qaher-1, Zelzal-3 and C-802 anti-vessel missiles, there is no exact information on the origin of the armament mentioned above, although UN researchers express the possibility that the source of the armistice comes from Yemen itself, Iran and Russia. (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2018)

*Illustration 2 Capacity of the missiles of Huties, **From***: *(Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2018)*

Missile Capabilities

Model	Type	Propellant	Deployment	Warhead Type	Country of Origin	Range (Km)
Scud–B (SS–1C; Hwasong–5)	Ballistic	Liquid	Road–Mobile	Conventional, nuclear, or Chemical	USSR (North Korea)	300
Scud–C (Hwasong 6)	Ballistic	Liquid	Road–Mobile	Conventional or Chemical	USSR (North Korea)	600
SS–21 Scarab (Tochka)	Ballistic	Solid	Road–Mobile	Conventional or nuclear	USSR by way of North Korea	70
Zelzal–3	Ballistic	Solid	TEL	Conventional	Iran	250
Qaher–1	Ballistic	Solid/Liquid	Ground–mounted	Conventional	Yemen (reworked Soviet SA–2)	250
C–802 (CSS–N–8 Saccade)	Anti–ship Cruise	N/A	Ground–mounted	Conventional	China	120–180

Similarly, it is of great importance to highlight that the relationship between Iran and the Huties insurgent group has not been completely stable along the time line in which they have been related (2014-Present).

The extent of Tehran's influence over the Huties' decision-making process is unclear. The Huties have clearly acted against Iran's advice on several occasions during the war, including the 2015 request not to take control of Sana'a.. (McKernan, 2018)

According to Thomas Juneau, professor of international relations at the University of Ottawa, Iran's support for the Huties insurgent group increased from 2015, including small arms, ammunition, missiles and their parts and drones. The technical assistance is also part of the support, with the aim of keeping the equipment in good condition as well as teaching on the use of these; the above is done through the group that is also supported by Iran, Hezbollah. (Juneau, 2016)

As for Iran's support for the Huties group with armament transfer, it has to be due to the interception of an Iranian vessel heading for Yemen loaded with a large quantity of weapons, explosives and military equipment manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the insurgent group and Tehran's ally, Huties. This reflects the fact that the connection between the two parties, although not completely stable, exists and movements have been carried out that commit Iran to the activities of the Huties group. (Avilés Farré, 2015)

Iran's interest in the Yemen conflict and more specifically with the Huties group is due to the role played by its enemy, Saudi Arabia, in this region. Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen as well as its interest in this territory has three pillars, which are: returning Abd Rabbuh Mansur to the Hadi to the Yemeni presidency, eradicating the military and political movements of the Huties and finally curbing the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Yemen. (Lauria, 2015)

It is concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran by supporting the Huties insurgent group confronts one of its main rivals in the region, Saudi Arabia, while giving it the opportunity to make its ideology known and gaining the trust and vote of the Shiite population for which it fights through the Huties insurgent group.

2.2.2 Iran-Hamas:

Since its inception the insurgent group located in the Gaza Strip has had two branches, with which they intend to meet their objectives and goals in both branches, these being a military branch, also known as Al Qassam Brigades, which has under its charge the fight against its main enemy Israel. The other branch of Hamas is purely political, this branch is responsible for building schools, hospitals and providing aid to the Palestinian population in religious and social issues, with this last branch Hamas generates that the population identifies with the movement of the group and promotes them. (BBC World, 2014)

Since Hamas is a Sunni insurgent group, it generates the belief of a high enmity between Iran (Shiite state) and the group, the main reason why these two religious factions relate to each other is a common enemy, in this case Israel, and its objective is to overthrow the advances, presence and Israeli influence of the territory. (Reigeluth, 2011)

According to Matthew Levitt, director of anti-terrorism intelligence at WINEP (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) for Iran and Hamas, this relationship traditionally involves funding the group's militias as well as providing weapons. (Levitt, 2009)

Iran provides assistance with technology and missiles to the insurgent group Hamas in the Gaza Strip, of the aforementioned assistance are long-range missiles as well as the well-known Fajr-5, missiles from Iranian engineering, which have been directed on several occasions to the vicinity of Tel Aviv, City of Israel. (Kumar Sen, 2012)

Another type of aid offered by the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hamas is financial support, with which the group increases its ballistic arsenal, with the acquisition of Qassam missiles, which are manufactured in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, Iran's financial support for the Palestinian insurgent group enables the latter to improve the models supplied by Iran.. (Gutierrez Lopez, 2013)

Illustration 3 *Qassam Missiles* ***From:*** *(Allende, 2019)*

In recent years the relationship between Iran and Hamas has deteriorated for various reasons, one of which is Iran's support for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad in his fight against Sunni groups in his state, it is worth mentioning that Hamas provides support to Sunni groups involved in the conflict in Syria. The Islamic Republic of Iran used to support Hamas with monetary funding of approximately USD $20 million per month, money that is sufficient not only to upgrade and acquire more weapons and missiles as mentioned above, but also to maintain power over the Gaza government. (BBC World, 2014)

The confidence between Iran and Hamas group has deteriorated over the years this has been boosted due to the independence that the insurgent group has acquired, as well as the aid to it from third states other than Iran, it is worth mentioning that these third states are enemies and competence of the Islamic Republic of Iran for supremacy in the region as well as in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. (Gutierrez Lopez, 2013)

This has not been enough to prevent the transfer of arms from stopping and the Hamas insurgent group from continuing to fight against Israeli developments and influence on its territory on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2.2.3 Iran-Irak, The case of Muqtada Al Sadr and the Al-Mahdi Military.

Having explained the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the conflict in Iraq, it opens the way to explain and analyze the relationship between Iran and Muqtada Al Sadr and the militia under the latter's command.

Muqtada Al Sadr is a radical Chiita cleric, considered one of the strongest politicians in Iraq even though he has never held a position in the country's government. He is a leader of the political party "Sadrsita Movement" and of the Al Mahdi militia. (Bahry, 2019)

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The militia better known as the Army Al Mahdi, under the command of Al Sadr, became known after the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, this militia is known in that year as pioneers of anti-American movements. (BBC Mundo, 2016)

The centers of power of the Al Mahdi militia are located in the towns of Kufa and Najaf as well as in the city of Sadr and Iraq's capital, Baghdad. At the beginning of the insurgent group (2003) it is believed that it had an approximate of between 500 and 1000 combatants

as well as an approximate of active participants of between 5,000 and 6,000 men. (El Mundo, 2004)

In 2014, Al Mahdi's army demonstrated its military might through a march of its 20,000 combatants, many of them in explosive vests, thus showing its commitment to the cause and ideology of its leader, Muqtada Al Sadr and its continued struggle against the militias of the Islamic State in Iraq.   (Europa Press, 2014)

The relationship between Iran and Muqtada Al Sadr is not as expected knowing that both parties are Shiites, Muqtada Al Sadr then spoke about his disagreement with Iran's action in Iraqi territory, likewise Muqtada Al Sadr has expressed his great desire to disassociate / distance himself from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the influence it has imposed in Iraq. (Al-Min, 2018)

It is also important to note that on different occasions Muqtada Al Sadr has refused to join Iran's campaign to form a government in Iraq, has visited on several occasions one of Iran's main rivals in the region as Saudi Arabia, Muqtada Al Sadr has also offered strong criticism to paramilitary groups that are pro-Iran in Iraqi territory. (The Arab Weekly, 2019)

According to Ana Belén Soage, an analyst at the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I financially support Al Mahdi's army in order to help it in its fight against the American militias that invaded Iraqi territory. I also know the amount of this monetary support or even today the Islamic Republic of Iran offers this type of aid to the Iraqi insurgent group or its leader, Muqtada Al Sadr. (Soage, 2018)

2.2.4 Iran- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the case of Al Quds.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard, or CGRI, is an institution established during the Islamic revolution of 1979 by the late Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, with the aim that the militia guard this revolution from enemies of the region as well as foreign enemies that might arise in the conflict, such a revolution would lead to the creation of what is now known as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the well-known Arab spring it is believed that the CGRI militia and other voluntary militias make the perfect instrument for the expansion of Iran's influence and finally the fulfillment of the Axis of Resistance. (Clarin , 2018)

This militia, unlike others, does not answer to elected officials in the different elections held by the country, but answers only to the supreme leader (Ali Khamenei). At the beginning of the militia, with approximately 125,000 men, they emerged from the forces protecting Ayatollah Khomeini and the other important clerics of the country. (Gambill, 2019)

The elite al Quds are a branch within the CGRI, which is aimed at coping with unconventional war and intelligence activities as well as being responsible for operations outside Iranian territory, this sub-unit of the CGRI is headed by General Qasem Soleimani, who also plays the role of general in the CGRI. This sub-unit also supports on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran other insurgent groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Huties, as well as the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. (Iran Watch, 2018)

Regarding Al Quds' support to insurgent groups (Hezbollah, Hamas and Huties), the Iranian brigade provides support to these insurgent groups through military and strategic training so that they can carry out and succeed with military campaigns and operations in their respective countries. This is achieved through military subdivisions outside Iran

(Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Syria). (The Meir Amit Intelligence an Terrorism Center, 2017)

In 2013, the Al Quds brigade assisted the Yemeni Huties insurgent group with military weapons such as AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades. It is equally important to mention that the Yemeni Coast Guard found/intercepted a boat with which the illegal transport of weapons, explosives and other types of weapons from Iran was taking place, which strengthens the relationship between the Al Quds brigade and the Huties group in Yemen. (Keshavarz, 2015)

The Al Quds brigade also offers support in Syria where there are constant clashes of the Iranian brigade against ISIS in Syria where the Iranian brigade is present and supports its ally President Bashar Al Assad and the militias under his command. (Gross, 2019)

The connection between the Al Quds brigade and the Hezbollah insurgent group in Lebanon dates back to 1982 when the Iranian brigade on behalf of Iran (as a country) provided economic, military and admiring support for the construction and establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon, since then the Al Quds brigade maintains a stable connection with Hezbollah in Lebanon. (Terfry, 2013)

The "export of the revolution" which is a strategy within Iranian foreign policy to expand Islamic influence within the Middle East region, which connects with the creation of a Shiite pathway within the Middle East for greater Shiite influence within the region, so Iran is promoting and funding a revolution of Shiite groups in different Middle Eastern countries in order to have greater Islamic influence in the region.

2.3 Dispute for the Leadership in the Middle East.

Historically the Middle East region has had great differences in religion and its different branches, especially between Sunnis and Shiites, in addition to trade disputes, for control of oil in the region as well as control and political and economic power over it, these disputes for decades have created a rivalry between major powers in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. Iran is largely Shiite Muslim, while Saudi Arabia sees itself as the main Sunni Muslim power, and Turkey is also a country whose majority is under Sunni rule. Each of these countries is in search of positioning itself as a leader of the region and being an influential international level.

> *Historically Saudi Arabia, a monarchy and home to the birthplace of Islam, saw itself as the leader of the Muslim world. However, this was challenged in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution in Iran which created a new kind of state in the region, a kind of theocracy, which had an explicit goal of exporting this model beyond its own borders.* (BBC NEWS , 2017)

Since the Arab Spring the differences between these countries intensified much more, after the protests in the Arab world the Middle East region was plunged into political instability because the different countries in the region such as Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, were extremely affected by these protests and reached levels of civil wars within them, so Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey sought to expand their influence, providing economic, military and political aid to these countries. A great example of this is Iran seeking the leadership of the Middle East by creating a land corridor that extends from the interior of the country to the Mediterranean, this corridor being governed by a Shiite control which was explained earlier and also its nuclear program. (BBC NEWS , 2017)

Saudi Arabia and Turkey are also planning their foreign policy strategies or action plan to position themselves as the leading power in the Middle East, so that there is a homogeneous Islamist policy in the region.

2.3.1 Saudi Arabia Leading power in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is one of the powers of the Middle East region, one of the world's leading oil exporters and one of the Muslim religious leaders of the Sunni branch. Its main objective is to bring the entire Middle East region under Sunni control, seeking to influence smaller countries in the region through political, economic and military support for Sunni rulers. A clear example was their support to Iraq during the 8 year war with Iran. While the war was spreading, in 1987, the Saudi Arabian riot police confronted Iranian pilgrims in Mecca, thus giving greater military force to Iraq, maintaining Sunni power, this worked until 2003 when Iraq was invaded by the United States and overthrew Saddam Hussein's mandate, which unleashed a political power for the Iraqi country's Shiites who were repressed by Saudi influence. (Pearson, 2016)

It is also important to emphasize that Saudi Arabia has become directly involved in the Syrian conflict and has channeled its aid to the rebel groups of the Islamic Front, which it presumes to be an organization similar to its conservative and anti Jihadist Islamist ideology; although it has not ceased to support the decimated secular rebels, Saudi Arabia has assumed a leading role within the Sunni strategic bloc, positioning itself as the one in charge of channeling support to the Islamist Syrian opposition.

The Sunni axis began to be led by Saudi Arabia in November 2013, when it became the main supporter of the Islamic Front. This country has promoted its policy through the creation of the Syrian Islamic Front and diplomatically through the Arab League, using it as an instrument of power with the aim of creating a solid coalition that would allow an eventual international intervention in favor of its national interests. When the United States and Russia signed the agreement to dismantle nuclear weapons in the Syrian civil war and in the region, Saudi Arabia had to take more radical measures, such as strengthening and assisting Islamic forces, which increases the political polarization of the Syrian country and the region, with this type of strategy Saudi Arabia seeks to increase its influence in the region and also to contain the expansion of Shiite power that Iran is spreading. (Ghotme, Garzón, & Cifuentes Ortiz, 2013)

Saudi Arabia is a country that has a great economic backing due to its large sources of oil and its global commercialization, as a regional leader, it also seeks total control of the region's energy resources. In fact, it tries to undo or block the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline plan approved by President al-Assad in 2009. Saudi policy seeks to keep the flow and price of oil safe, avoiding abrupt or violent transitions, promoting its wealth, reducing the risk of long-term foreign investment and, above all, reconciling its oil policy with U.S. interests. It also maintains a double anti-Iranian policy is based on two elements: first, the need to propagate Sunni Islam the second is based on a sense of regional or border insecurity. (Ghotme, Garzón, & Cifuentes Ortiz, 2013)

The three pillars on which Saudi Arabia is based (religious, socio-economic and international-political) have a very close interconnection between them. The pact between political power through the al-Saud monarchy and the religious power represented by the Wahhabi movement is the element that legitimates the monarchy. This approach gives internal stability to the authoritarian regime of the Arab country, as well as the possibility of acting as the center of the Sunni Muslim world, which gives it the possibility of religious mobilization. As for the socio-economic system, it is ratified in the creation of a social model of superior welfare for Saudi nationals, with a wide distribution of subsidies and bonuses based on the reinter character of the economy based on oil and gas, which translates into social peace and political stability. At present, it seeks to modernize this model, towards something more open with the international community and with its neighbors in the Middle East, it also seeks to be more competitive and sustainable in the region. As far as the international-political aspect is concerned, the alliance with the United States stands out since the end of the Second World War, which includes political, economic and military aspects, and which had made it possible to maintain security on the international scene and in the region, until 2011, when the Arab spring took place, so Saudi Arabia had to modify its foreign policy strategies in order to face a multipolar and more competitive world. (Gonzalez, 2017)

2.3.2 Turkey as lider in the Middle East.

Some of the countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria consider Turkey as a model of Islamic liberalism. The current state of Turkey is the result of an evolutionary process, it does not mean that they have had a rapid development, but it has the capacity, through its current example, to serve as a model to follow for some Middle Eastern countries that still suffer repercussions of the Arab spring. Turkey has a moderate, democratically elected Islamic party responsible for an economic boom. Turkey's experience shows that the East does not have to choose between an authoritarian government and an Islamist regime. Turkey shows a third option: Islamic liberalism. With its conservative social and cultural mentality, but with a liberal political and economic program. Turkey, also by developing political, economic and cultural relations with all the countries of the region, has played an important role in the reconstruction of the Middle East after the aftermath of the Arab spring. By removing visa restrictions, it has helped many victims of the region's civil wars and conflicts to migrate in search of a better quality of life, also by developing cultural and commercial relations and exporting its television programs, not only in the region but internationally, Turkey has exposed Arabs to new ways of thinking about Islam, modernism and elections. (Kaya, 2012)

In this volatile and fragmented scenario, the figure of Turkey has emerged strongly as a possible regional power, due to the radical turn its foreign policy has undergone, characterized since the Second World War in strengthening its ties with Western countries. However, in the last decade, Turkey has rediscovered the Middle East and has emerged as an important actor in the region. Turkey's foreign policy strategies towards the Middle East region do not mean a move away from the West or an Islamisation of its foreign policy, but represent the way in which Turkey has adapted to the changing world of International Relations that emerged from the end of the Cold War. The Turkish state has now focused its foreign policy strategies on the Middle East as this is where you come from most of the

risks and threats to the country's security which is a challenge, for example the growing violence and sectarianism in Syria, the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism and separatism due to the experiences of this people in neighboring states, the sectarian violence in Iraq, the Islamist threat of ISIS, the possible emergence of a nuclear Iran at Turkish borders, and a weak and fragmented Lebanon dominated by groups with close ties to Syria and Iran. This type of situation generates doubts in the community about the stability and capacity of the Turkish state to maintain its policies and security, but Turkey has been quite successful with these policies and this success is due to Turkish external work, and this is based on multiple factors and elements, among which the political stability, economic growth and the use of the strategic geographical situation stand out as generators of positive dynamics.. (Bartolome, 2015)

One of the main factors determining Turkey's growth in power and regional influences, as well as its economic success, is the constitution of its territory as a transit point for raw materials from exporters to importers. Turkey's Energy Strategy" stresses that "Turkey is geographically located around 70% of the world's proven gas and oil reserves, forming a natural energy bridge between producer countries, the Middle East and the Caspian Sea, and consumer markets, consolidating itself as a key country to achieve energy security through diversification of suppliers and routes. It has become a significant and more affordable factor for Europe, contributing to the energy security of the European continent and Middle East region. (Bartolome, 2015)

The Islamist policy of Recep Tayyip Erdogan who governs Turkey has taken a position vis-à-vis the United States and the rest of Western countries in general, since the rapprochement of Turkey, which is a member of NATO, with Iran runs counter to the policy of the Western world, due to the existing tensions between Iran and the United States over the nuclear program and the sanctions imposed on Iran for the manufacture and commercialization of nuclear inputs and weapons. The ultimate purpose of ruling Turkish Islamism is to obtain regional political hegemony by forcing the end of Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip and to favor a change of government in Israel, which in turn needs allies from the region in order to achieve its objective, since with the Israeli alliance and the

United States it becomes more complicated to overthrow the government of Israel. (Reig, 2016)

The strategic location of this country has helped to obtain not only a cultural and political wealth, but also made Turkey an intermediary and ally for the great powers that surround it. Every major event affects it directly or indirectly. So Turkey's role is elementary in the face of the conflict of interests that arises between both areas and Turkey knows how to take advantage of that. Hence the importance of Turkey's international relations with the rest of the Middle East. Turkey seeks to be recognized in the Middle East as a leading power that implements a "Soft Power", this figure suggests and gives ideas but does not become a model. Hence the importance of being seen as a neutral country. (Valero, 2013)

2.3.3 Iran as lider of the middle east and its nuclear program.

Iran is a country whose nuclear ambitions constitute one of the most sensitive problems facing the international community. Iran has sought nuclear technology since 1950, based on a program called "atoms for peace. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an agreement that sought to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons, so that all nuclear activities were monitored and under the supervision of the IAEA. In the mid-1970s, Iran made great advances in terms of the nuclear program in order to modernize and industrialize the country, with local scientific capacity and foreign technologies. Since the 1979 Revolution, which transformed Iran's pro-Western monarchical and autocratic regime into an Islamic Republic, this Nuclear Plan was seen as another tool of imperialist control of the country at an unsustainable financial cost. All projects in progress were suspended, including the nuclear power plant that Germany was building on the Persian Gulf in Bushehr. (Molteni, 2013)

Iran has unwittingly managed to consolidate a hegemonic position in the region. In the midst of Arab states, on the one hand, and its rivalry with Pakistan for control of Afghanistan, on the other, the Islamic Republic has acquired an important place in the

regional dynamic. With a hybrid democratic fundamentalist government, Iran breaks with classic power models and accommodates ideologies that oppose Western models, while inspiring many others that require a leading state against US hegemony, giving Iran the title of being the only country in the Middle East where Islam is in retreat, but its policy functions on the basis of the Islamist orientation, in such a way that if Iran succeeds in capitalizing on its current political revolution, for some it can become the model of a radical, revolutionary-Islamic state that achieves a transition from an original, inclusive and functional democracy, and thus consolidates its power vis-à-vis the West. With the election of Hassan Rouhani and his proposal of a "government of prudence and hope", centered on economic reactivation, the creation of a "declaration of citizenship rights" and the adoption of a more flexible and moderate diplomacy vis-à-vis the Western world, especially in relation to the nuclear issue, which allowed him to reach the historic agreements indicated. The first agreement raised Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment above 5%, i.e. to paralyze its military nuclear program. This led to Iran marketing gold and precious metals to the European Union so that its economy would be stable, also gave a boost to the production and marketing of crude oil internationally. Iran in energy terms is seen by the West as the impossible door to contour in Asia, and a possible intermediary with the Middle East, however, understanding Iranian politics and strategies is much more complex since current Iranian politics does not represent a break with its traditional hegemonic vocation, but simply a return to pre-revolutionary expansionism. (Ideaz, 2015)

In the geopolitical context Several factors are benefiting from the resurgence of Iran's role in the Middle East, such as regional stability in the Persian Gulf, this is due to the new relations and balance between Iran and Iraq. Furthermore, Iran has launched itself to deepen its nuclear program, since in this way it can avoid and ensure that it is not going to be invaded by outside Americans as it happened to Iraq, the basis of Iranian foreign policy, is to maintain its nuclear program in order to position itself as a power in the Middle East. Iran is a state that has a regional leadership facility, due to its territorial extension, its population, its geographical situation, and its wealth in natural and mineral resources; they gather the appropriate components to be a main country, regional leader and actor.

Iran is a fundamental figure in the stability not only of the Middle East but also of the international community. Furthermore, it plays an increasingly important role in the Mediterranean basin, especially in its eastern slope, as well as in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Thanks to this, its capacity for stabilization or destabilization makes it one of the main actors in the international system. The great protests unleashed in the Arab spring managed to shake up the Arab world, which led to a destabilization of the power held in the region, mostly by Saudi Arabia, which means that Iran benefits from the destitution or weakening of the Arab leaders who were its greatest adversaries and began to project its growing influence on the other countries in the region that were plunged into civil wars. A crucial factor in foreign policy and strategies for positioning itself as a power is Iran's energy capacity and its importance for relations with countries dependent on its resources. Iran's oil and gas reserves are the second most important, after Saudi Arabia and Russia, respectively. There are events that are demonstrating Iran's centrality in the international arena. Among them are the crises over its nuclear program, its role in the internal struggles in Iraq and Syria, as well as its relations with the political and armed Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. Iran's regional ambitions are specifically focused on the nuclear issue, because the possession of this type of armament will guarantee it solid political weight in the region. (Eliades, 2011)

3. Conclutions and Recommendations.

3.1 Conclutions

This connects directly with the involvement of Iran in the internal conflicts of countries such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, which is given due to the geopolitical and religious expansion interest with which the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to comply. Expanding its influence in the Middle East in order to find a way out of the Mediterranean is also one of the objectives it wants to achieve through the creation of the Shiite corridor or arch, which provides great commercial benefits not only to Iran but also to the Shiite population that drives these interests.

The Islamic Republic of Iran by supporting different insurgent groups that identify with the purpose of Tehran's mandate manages to consolidate its influence and export the revolution over the same territories controlled or in which these groups and other leaders are present. With the above, Iran can meet, manage and control the axis of resistance, the main strategy by which the Islamic Republic of Iran strengthens its influence and exports the revolution in order to be recognized as the leader of the Middle East region.

The leadership in the Middle East is a dispute that arises mainly between Saudi Arabia, the main Sunni power, and Iran, which is the main Shiite power, but from the Arab spring a new fundamental actor emerges, Turkey, Each of these three countries seeks hegemony in the region, so their relations with each other are very tense, Iran through its nuclear program seeks control of the region and recognition in the international community, Turkey on the other hand seeks power and control through international relations with countries in the region and with the international community to position itself as a power, while Saudi Arabia seeks to remain a Sunni power in the region by supporting Sunni revolutionaries, in addition to maintaining trade and diplomatic relations with the United States to have power both in the region and in the international community.

3.2 Recomendations

The Islamic Republic of Iran was recommended to strengthen its relations with insurgent groups and their mandatories such as Muqtada al Sadr and the army Al Mahdi, in order to expand its influence and further strengthen its position in the Middle East region.

It is also important that Iran have a better management of nuclear weapons and seek better diplomatic and trade relations with countries in the region and the international community.

Many changes are currently taking place in the Middle East, and the leadership position is crucial, so the economic factor plays an important role, and with the era of oil almost over, new strategies must be sought to sustain the economy and have relevance in international trade.

For more than a century, the only restrictions on producing ever-increasing amounts of oil came from geopolitical problems, not geology. The economic crises and nationalist expropriations of oil fields were largely responsible for the ups and downs in oil production and the prices of more than 140 golden years of the oil era. (Whipple, 2017)

Predicting the future of the oil site in the Middle East is difficult, as there are several factors that influence the production and consumption of fossil fuels These range from the course of climate change to the health of the world, the economy, new scientific discoveries, geopolitical upheavals. (Whipple, 2017)

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