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# **Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia**

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## **Resumen**

El Sudeste Asiático se ha convertido en un eje central a la hora de vislumbrar el escenario referente al terrorismo. El objeto de la investigación es descubrir las medidas utilizadas para controlar el terrorismo y fortalecer las relaciones en la región. En cuanto al terrorismo en el Sudeste Asiático este se genera principalmente por ciclos de radicalización del islam efectuados por grupos terroristas que influidos por el Islam Fundamentalista o Extremista proyectan influir en la población para captar más adeptos y así llegar a generar terror, si bien esta población es minoría, de no infundir en la población las escuelas de pensamiento del Islam Moderado estos grupos terroristas podrían tomar a la población vulnerable o de zonas pobres para inducirlas en su filosofía y de esta forma integrarla a sus filas, con lo cual, las medidas rápidas pero que estén dirigidas al inicio del ciclo de radicalización son aquellas que permitirán al Sudeste Asiático solucionar en gran medida al nacimiento de nuevos seguidores del Daesh.

**Palabras Clave:** Relaciones Internacionales, Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático, Grupo Abu Sayyaf, Grupo Económico, Geopolítica.

## **Abstract**

Southeast Asia has become a central axis when it comes to talk about terrorism. The purpose of the investigation is to discover the measures used to control terrorism and strengthen relations in the region. About the terrorism in Southeast Asia, this is mainly generated by cycles of radicalization of Islam carried out by terrorist groups which, influenced by Fundamentalist or Extremist Islam, plan to influence the population in order to attract followers and thus generate terror, although this population is a minority, of not instilling in the population the schools of thought of Moderate Islam, these Terrorist Groups could take the vulnerable population or from poor areas to induce them in their philosophy and thus integrate into their lines, for that, the quick measures directed at the beginning of the radicalization cycle are those that will allow Southeast Asia to solve in a great way the birth of ne Daesh followers.

**Key Word:** International Relations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Abu Sayyaf Group, Economic Group, Geopolitics.

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## **Introduction**

Southeast Asia has glimpsed that indigenous Islamic military groups have been in the region for decades. Being the common one, that these groups did not maintain interaction among themselves, or this one, was relatively weak, since most of them operated in their territory, whether it was a country, island or inflection area, with the aim of promoting the adoption of the population Sharia law or Islamic law and thus seek independence from the government barrier. This scenario raised problems for the security of the region at the time these groups began to operate jointly, share information and carry out transnational networks to carry out operations in the different states of the region, thanks to this, the countries of the Southeast Asian, through the ASEAN organization, have taken measures against Fundamentalist or Extremist terrorism that some of these groups have managed to promote Islam. Thanks to the attacks carried out by these extremist groups, such as those that took place in Bali in 2002 and 2005 in which there was greater international uptake, the need to confront these groups was glimpsed, which aim to establish independent Islamic states in the areas in which the preponderance of the population is a Muslim majority, in turn, to overthrow the governments they call authoritarian, remedy poverty and class difference and thus supplant the secular government by a new supranational Islamic state, which they project , as a connection that encompasses all the countries of Southeast Asia. It is important to note the fact that “Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim majority states; The Philippines has a sizeable, historically alienated, separatist-minded Muslim minority.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

Regarding the understanding of the local terrorist groups of Southeast Asia, it is necessary to understand that historically these countries for demographic, economic, political and cultural reasons were victims of multiple variables that developed a discontent in the population, to which an answer is sought from a comprehensive perspective, both diplomatic and legal, so that a problem close to a region extremely important for international trade does not transcend to a global scenario of trade detriment.

The research allowed us to glimpse the progress of the policies carried out by ASEAN to develop a solid basis for trade, cultural exchange and development for the community, however, it shows how the process was and the measures taken by them to involve efficiently terror.

It studies, how the United States through soft power and direct actions carried out by the military section, positions its hegemony in the region by conducting negotiations, influencing leaders and carrying out joint campaigns with the member states of the area.

Regarding the development of the investigation, was used the deductive method, since it deals with what is terrorism (Macro) to be able to really focus on those terrorist acts and organizations in Southeast Asia and once the macro is solved and thus manage to respond to

the objectives set in the investigation. The research focus will be Qualitative and what is sought to project the scenarios under the scheme of a dynamic reality, in which each area generates different variables for the solution of the conflict.

In addition, books, reports, studies, minutes, newspapers, newspapers, and scientific magazines were used for the collection of information. The type of study used is the applied-explanatory. Applied because the existing theories and concepts will be the start point to understand what the focus of the research really is, the focal points, those terms, definitions, argumentative developments that allow us to focus on what is relevant to the research and explanatory because previously addressed the issue in question to be able to know it, describe it, identify relevant variables to understand the behavior of the determining variables in the development of objectives.

It was concluded that ASEAN has an excellent opportunity to confront and counteract efforts to generate separatist and extremist visions in the population. If governments really want to face terrorism in the region, they need to carry out policies with both public and private ones to promote Moderate Islam, being that, the Fundamentalist or extremist is rejected, to which they must improve the measures in Regarding sentencing, deterrence, interconnection (Greater border controls) and investing mainly in the restoration of vulnerable populations in order to break into the cycles of radicalization. More restoration and integration groups should be encouraged and how do (Greer & Watson, 2016) mention “Singapore’s RRG remains the only one of its kind in Asia; Such restorative approaches are urgently necessary.” If ASEAN seeks to advance in the degree of economic integration, joint policies and some other restructuring must be carried out, that is extremely crucial since that delays ASEAN for the resolution of issues regarding terrorism is the political parity that some members manage, being how alone There is a big difference in border and customs policies.

The work determines the history of terrorism from a detailed perspective and its evolution, which is extremely important to know the objectives of these groups, interpret the measures carried out by the different states, and finally conclude efficiently in ways to resolve the regional conflict. from Southeast Asia.

## **1.1 Formulation of the Project**

### **1.2 State of the art**

In the search for information to better understand the phenomenon of interest which is Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, the researcher was given the task of reading and capturing existing information in investigative journals, political science journals, articles, databases, background of studies. This in pages whose role consists of providing information, and specifically in order to understand and know relevant and contributing information for the subject in question, such as definitions, maps, events on specific dates, news and history about different cities, countries and terrorist groups that are involved within the subject matter in question. Seeking to build a base that had the foundations to be able to optimally develop the topic of the project to be investigated, so that in this way the information and data obtained allow the conclusions and results of the research to be in accordance with the objectives initially proposed.

The documents in question after reading them, were arranged in order according to their importance and degree of relevance to the subject under investigation.

The first document entitled *Terrorism in Southeast Asia* de (Kern, 2005) He claims that Southeast Asia is a place where radical Islamist terrorism is clearly found, mainly in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. As Islamist terrorist groups threaten the “Status quo of the region as it attempts to create independent Islamic states in Muslim-majority areas, overthrow existing secular governments and / or establish a new supranational Islamic state encompassing all countries in Southeast Asia” (Kern, 2005) With which the article begins by posing historical scenarios for Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia such as the Bali attacks in Indonesia on October 12, 2002, proceeds to analyze how the situation is in Afghanistan due to the aftermath of the war In which the United States was involved, thanks to this, a large number of the leaders of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia participated in or were directly trained in Afghanistan. Also, the article describes the main terrorist groups in Southeast Asia such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, Pembela Islam Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF- Moro Islamic Liberation Front), Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia. He then proceeds to describe each of the situations regarding terrorism in Southeast Asia and the countries that have been most affected by it, these being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, finally recording regional initiatives to mitigate the effects, although, there are really no clear and concise strategies to identify the development of the fight to eradicate or even control these groups, it is simply stated that the controversy and its plausible consequences for the crisis and financing regarding these groups have been addressed. Kern explains directly, clearly, concisely, precisely and to the core of the matter the terrorist groups, how the countries have

been affected and the antecedents towards Afghanistan, although information regarding how to control them or even keep them at bay is missing.

Within the priority order for the collection of information, the second study is entitled *Jemaah Islamiya and terrorism in Southeast Asia* for (Percival, 2011) in which the author presents his argument and the focus of the article in front of the previously mentioned organization, alluding to the Bali attack in October 2002, mainly affecting Indonesia. Percival begins his article putting in context about the demography in Indonesia for both the general population and that of the Muslim population, and describes directly how hegemony is distributed within the territory, being that 60% of its inhabitants live on the island of Java, being these more than 220 million in figures given in 2011, now also states that Indonesia being the fourth country in terms of population refers to the world level, is in turn the country with the largest Muslim population, having (Recall, for 2011) 200 million, being that in all Muslim countries in general there were for this time 285 million Muslims, the importance of the whole matter beyond the figures and the pertinent analyzes that may be raised, the important that Islam is generally tolerant (Being that they are "moderate"). Percival proceeds to make a historical account of Indonesia, implying that beyond mentioning in the title "Southeast Asia" he rather places special emphasis on this specific country. Then he describes the connection with Afghanistan and explains in general the situation in this country, with the terrorism generated by Jemaah Islamiya. Within the conclusions, Percival gives a very interesting point of view, which is that although there is abundant evidence that Jemaah Islamiya is guilty, there is a popular doubt that Indonesia is guilty of what they are accused of, due to rampant anti-Americanism and The fact that it seeks to overshadow and deny the existence of this terrorist group, has made the fact that the United States take suspected criminals as accused, has made the Indonesian population feel offended and seek that the United States hand over those who are suspected guilty so that they are tried within the national territory and thus the crimes of the Jemaah Islamiya are confirmed in public. From the article, you can get a lot of key information regarding Indonesia specifically and the Jemaah Islamiya, however, it does not raise the consequences of the acts that any of the parties may carry out, be it the USA, Indonesia, the Muslim population or Jemaah itself, being that leaves the opening to what will happen. The article makes a historical account of what happened and the origins of both factions, both Indonesia and the Jemaah, being that this poses a very hopeless situation for the future for the peace of the region because the Jemaah is fulfilling one of the objectives of each terrorist group, and this is to gain the empathy and support of the people.

The third article was *Region and Power politics in the Muslim world of Southeast Asia* (Siddique, 2002) Because the previous article raised by Percival left open the fact of the types of Muslim populations, and Sharon Siddique here states that there are two political trends within the Muslim world of Southeast Asia, the first being the fundamentalist Islamism that takes priority religion over politics and the second being the moderates who advocate and recognize the diversity of the ummah (Religion) and Realpolitik, are those who took the baton

from September 11 while previously it was the fundamentalists who were in control. The article sets out Malaysia's political history a little before, and after 9/11, describing the different political movements, those groups that came out, those who took control, and stating that Malaysia constitutes itself as an "Islamic state". He proceeds to describe how "Pan-Islamic" Islam works, which is one who, being a fundamentalist, seeks to expand the Islamic vision internationally, its main three premises are alternative global identity, utopian nature of personal experience, and the promise of a social order. fair and just. Being that the call of Pan Islamism really is not so far-fetched, presenting that regarding the alternative identity, the Muslims of Southeast Asia are part of the *ummah* in which the Muslim communities communicate through a common language, this being the Arabic one, they share the same traditions, same customs, traditions and rituals, and identification with more than a billion Muslims across the globe, with 20% of these living in Southeast Asia. Siddique continues with the explanation about how Southeast Asia adapted to Islam, within which it is stated that there is great diversity, and that Islam has not yet managed to take hegemony within the area, while there is still a complex heterogeneity religious, ethnic and cultural. Finally, what happened after September 11 is proposed, since if it touches on the subject of the United States, ASEAN and its post-September 11 acts, the article does not address terrorism as initially defined, but focuses solely on the religion and power, political and religious parity that goes hand in hand with the culture of the Muslim community.

On fourth place was *The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the War on Terror in Southeast Asia* (Archarya & Archarya, 2007) in which they argue that terrorism will become an important part of the South Asia region, the article which will describe what ASEAN has mentioned even before September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002 that terrorism is likely the most important security issue to address since the Indochina conflict. The ASEAN perspective is presented, since in January 2008 the leaders of this group renamed the serious risk that terrorism generates to the population, companies, national infrastructure and the environment. It is argued that regional and international peace must go hand in hand with economic development, since growth cannot be achieved without stability, it is for this reason that terrorism prevents the proper commercial flow of activities that intertwine regional cooperation. Both Acharya mention something really interesting, which is that the members varying between their conditions and capacities to face an insurgent force came to a common way of thinking, which is "non-interference" thus creating instability and reducing to a high degree, regional cooperation, being in this way the poor national and regional capacities to cooperate against these phenomena, opened the United States to intervene with its anti-terrorist efforts.

Finally you have *Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to terrorism* (Emmers, 2009). Since the Acharya previously touched security with ASEAN, it was pertinent to continue with the subject in question.

Emmers mentions in the same way that the previous article as after the terrorist attack of September 9, 2001 and the bombs in Bali, ASEAN had to take measures, since it would be a challenge due to the approach to security, which is based on "comprehensive" security and the principle of resilience. Since resilience was taken as a focus, in search of this, the ASEAN member countries have intervened terrorism at the national level from the variable of security policies, the arm of the law and compliance with it, socioeconomic, ideological and educational, with which they sought to intervene in terrorism directly from the culture, the new generations, economic development in this way, offering greater opportunities, and greater reciprocity between the law and the judicial apparatus. According to Emmers Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore have been more upright in tackling and dealing with terrorism than Thailand and Malaysia. Reflecting the synergy between national and regional resilience, ASEAN has been an organization that is responsible for supporting the interests and efforts to combat these terrorist groups and their growth under the principle of resilience. Because of this, he has had to commit himself to the great powers, for Emmers the current situation against terrorism in Southeast Asia is not optimistic, since the latent regional threat does not pose strong resistance from ASEAN.

As a conclusion to the state of the art, it was found that large terrorist groups in Southeast Asia such as Al Qaeda cells, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, Pembela Islam Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Kumpulan Muyaahidin Malaysia and finally the New People's Army have a notable presence that destabilizes the region from both economic and cultural growth, given that Muslims are having a great impact on the population, attracting more and more followers, while those fundamentalist Muslims are getting both the political power and repercussion in the region that allows these terrorist groups to carry out one of the purposes of the terrorist groups which is to take the love and support of the population, seeing them as the victims of an authoritarian state that fights against a minority that seeks to overthrow current power.

ASEAN as an association does not have the care to present its iron fist with which they should have been open to different states to intervene in what they thanks to their pro-resilience policies and with a low degree of intervention on compliance and defense of the state as the head entity of society, paying the defensive prospective to the United States, the one that does possess the conditions and will power to eradicate subversive groups or those outside the law.

He found that the history of the countries of Southeast Asia is directly linked to Islam, since, as Kern put it, since 1948 the Islamic army of Indonesia was created, with which these countries from their beginnings have been Muslim, for example, the case of Indonesia, which was created on August 17, 1945, considering itself Muslim from its foundations, another example is the case of Malaysia, which was born as a republic on September 16, 1963 and has also been a Muslim since its birth, also a case of Philippines which was on July 4, 1946.

The issue of Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia has taken off since September 11 or the attacks in Bali in 2002; however, there is not enough information prior to these events to be able to track their actions and plan their possible movements using foresight.

It is mentioned that ASEAN does not take strong enough actions to control or eliminate these illegal groups, so there is not enough information about how the USA is preventing these acts from happening, the international reaction, the physical, tangible and plausible acts carried out by ASEAN and what they are doing to eradicate them.

Nor is the MILF dissent mentioned, as these groups cooperate with Abu Sayyaf, Al Qaeda and ISIS in the territory.

The peace treaty with the MILF on the part of the Philippines was not mentioned in any case, nor how it acts against Abu Sayyaf.

The issue of economic projects in the zones was not touched so that these groups, government projects, move away. The possible presence of ISIS and Al Qaeda in the area. Similarly, there is no mention of the military operations that were carried out in order to eradicate these terrorist groups.

It is argued that economic strategies are being carried out, but there is no mention of what, much less the impact they have with economic growth, nor the contrast that they receive from terrorism.

There has been no discussion of actions to eradicate these terrorist groups, as there is no mention of operations, strategies or responses to acts or actions that they carry out.

Within the research study of the subject in question, it was found that although there is a lot of information after September 11 and Bali in 2002, it was taken as a problem that these groups really threatened the development and well-being of these Southeast Asian countries.

There is a clear argument gap in terms of responses, political actions, strategies, the effect of policies, real effect on the economy, growth in the attractiveness of these groups to the population, allies and their respective actions, influential acts carried out by ASEAN What are you doing to prevent the creation of another Islamic state? How, in turn, does international cooperation prevent a Second Front?



### **1.3 Problem Statement**

Since the beginning of the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia, these have had the presence of terrorist groups in their territory, this has led to the current parity between what is under the state's capabilities to anticipate and mitigate and what is not has the ability to cope. The first five member nations of ASEAN founded the organization during times of cold war in 1967 with the aim of making the region more stable, with which the first agreed conclusions were in times of international tension, with all the countries that are part of The organization signed an agreement to be against the development of nuclear weapons, in addition to a treaty against terrorism.

Due to this, the terrorist groups in the region have become a focus at the international level, calling the attention of external agents to the situation and problems, thanks to this, the ASEAN member states have been losing the ability to confront them and each time is less the power they have in front of some groups outside the law that over time gain even more support and followers. This is because during the development of these countries the baton was held by the fundamentalist Muslims and those moderates did not have the recognition that post September 11 if they were given, this led to the state, religion and culture giving it the opportunity for growth to the same groups that today make them partakers of news in chains worldwide, in addition to population growth, migration and economic growth opportunities, added with the low interest in regulating or monitoring those sectors that serve as financing such as drug trafficking, make a cause that did not last long, end up becoming a quantifiable symptom at the international level, the effect known as "snowball" happened that ended up leading to these Lawless groups at the forefront of United Nations forums and talks.

What is being done to control, persecute, and eradicate these groups?



## **Research objectives**

### **1.3.1 General Objective**

Analyze actions by ASEAN to confront terrorist groups, which led the United States to intervene in a regional conflict and to have an international reaction after 9/11 until 2019.

### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

- Examine the actions taken by ASEAN as an organization to confront, control, reduce power or presence / participation and confront these terrorist groups.
- Evaluate the measures taken by the United States to promote security in relations in Southeast Asia, as well as how it is preventing terrorist groups from obtaining more participation at the international level.
- Describe the relationship of Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiya with Al Qaeda and ISIS and how they cooperate within the territory with the aim of creating an Islamic State on another side of the world.

#### **1.4 Justification**

The research could provide new knowledge about how terrorist groups act, think and project, as it would serve individuals or researchers interested in topics such as terrorism, religious terrorism, Southeast Asia and cultural backgrounds in the region that could even give rise to business opportunities thereby generating knowledge and added value for those who take the present as a background for projects, research or similar or related articles. Research can develop knowledge that could be a guide in identifying whether or not international agreements, the global agenda, and the way of looking at terrorism on the globe are adequate and how political and social disputes that lead groups on the margins should be resolved. of the law to carry out intimidating or immoral acts towards the population.

It could revise and expand the concept of terrorism and its different types, contributing to expanding the state of the art and contributing valuable knowledge to geopolitics. Following the objectives of the research, this could solve problems that seriously impact society and that are currently important on the international agenda while generating a positive social impact on the population. The investigation could give rise to future investigations about patterns in terrorist groups and in this way learn to recognize the way in which they carry out intelligence and, even in a very deep degree of investigation, it could give rise to how to anticipate their actions and in this way. way to ensure the free flow of goods and people over the territories having a great contribution to geopolitics and world trade. For researchers, research could be the beginning of a line of knowledge opening to a postgraduate degree, deepening knowledge that allows them to take up positions that require diplomacy and knowledge of a specific region such as being an ambassador, offering business ideas, talks, conferences, books, a host of possibilities provided by the knowledge developed based on research, which in turn could in a very unlikely case open the dream of the research team of being strategists not only in the market but in the military field.

### **1.5 Frame of Reference**

Although there is no universally accepted and global definition of terrorism, it is known what are the acts or effects that position a certain group as terrorists in global spheres, but beyond this, it is curious to find that the definition of terrorism is so vague, unfinished and void of content. The definition proposed by the SAR (RAE) for terrorism is that the latter is “1. M. Domination by Terror. 2. m. Succession of acts of violence executed to instill terror. 3. m. Criminal activity by organized gangs, which, repeatedly and usually indiscriminately, aims to create social alarm for political purposes.” (Real Academia Española, 2019) being that nothing else the last point really touches on what terrorism is. As stated by Bruce Hoffman in his book *Inside Terrorism* “terrorism is a political concept” (Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006) This is a short but precise explanation of what terrorism is, an act for political purposes.

The FBI considers “terrorists to be criminals.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005) Being that as criminals they attack the sovereignty of the state, when carrying out acts outside the legal framework, it is also stated that terrorists are placed under arrest not because there is a specific law that is "terrorism" but that they are condemned under the existing legal statutes (The facts are reviewed and the due law is taken that within Hermeneutics allows to pigeonhole the actor of terrorism). Terrorism is defined within the federal code of regulations “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Code of Federal Regulations, 2019)

Being that terrorism is spoken of as the illegal use of force and violence against people or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian population or any segment thereof, in compliance with political or social objectives, with which not only terrorism is considered to be a political act, but in turn it is carried out in order to generate either political or social objectives by force or terror.

In general, agencies such as the FBI, US DOS (United States Department of Security), US DOD (United States Department of Defense) pose common effects regarding terrorism, within which issues such as the pursuit of political objectives or modify the social agenda, which are achieved through premeditated acts which target the civilian population, they are also commonly clandestine groups which, although they manage objectives of a political or social nature, change the focus depending on the environment, the state and the relationship with the same.

Bruce Hoffman (Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006) in his book *Inside Terrorism* he defines terrorism as an element inherent to politics in which the relevance of power cannot be modified, since, for him, terrorism, although it was something totally confined to political conditions, was part of the search for power, power as a tool to effect political change, for which he catalogs the need for violence or its threat with or for political objectives.

The term terrorism has been developing for longer than you might think, as Nicholas J. Perry put it in his article. *The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of*

*Too Many Grails* the definition of terrorism has been compared to the holy grail sought by King Arthur since they share multiple forms (Perry, 2004) to which a metaphor is made in turn not only with the term in question but with the same search for information, since Nicholas states that just like multiple knights trying to find the holy grail, few are able to complete the mission, at just like clarifying the term terrorism. But terrorism has varied in definition in general given the era and place, some etymological studies give rise to terrorism as a result of the French Revolution, this being the " Doctrine of Terror " product of the revolutionary experience of Maximilien Robespierre between 1792 and 1794 which alludes to the change related to State Terror since the latter raises "the problems of the relationship between Law and Terror in the republican order linked to the revolutionary Government and its opposition to the monarchical model of the Old Regime." (Villacís, 2017)

“If the main instrument of popular government in peacetime is virtue, in a moment of revolution there must be both virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless.” (Robespierre, 1974) Following these events, the Oxford English Dictionary begins to define terrorism literally as “System of Terror” (Cambridge, 2017) this definition being completely literal to the one mentioned by Robespierre and being not only vague and devoid of content but the beginning of the entire development of the topic and why initially terrorism was raised not by "liberating" groups against "injustices" " of the state in question, but by the state itself in order to induce fear in society and to control the insurgent wishes of a group of rebels, with which terrorism as an object of study not only deviated from its origins but that the objectives changed from being the state in favor of controlling anarchist populations to being the latter, putting under pressure and questioning the capacity, power and ideals of the state because at the beginning of the 20th century the assassin of the president of the States United William McKinley called himself anarchist in 1901, while this fact in Europe terrorism was taking sides under the status of "freedom fighters" because Scottish independence towards Great Britain was using guerilla tactics, systematic assassinations and bombs in the midst of the civilian population (which are effects of terrorism, since it is correct to mention that terrorism is carried out by rational entities, with the capacity to raise different strategies that allow them to reach their focus point). Due to these historical facts, the term terrorism crossed from being the state participant to being the victim of it, however, during the course of World War II it was used against the authoritarian regimes of the Axis Powers, these being Germany, Italy and Japan. After the events of the Second World War, terrorism was defined for those "freedom fighters", while the debate within international law is about whether governments can carry out this, almost like the accusations that are brought to the United States about the intervention in China, Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, India and Bangladesh.

After the events that occurred with Robespierre in Europe, a number of events occurred that developed the idea of terrorism a little more in line with *The Four Waves of Rebel Terror* in which David C. Rapoport (Rapoport, 2002) raises the focus of his research.

The four waves of terrorism mentioned by David C. Rapoport (Rapoport, 2002) they are the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the wave of the new left and the religious wave. Being that it is expressed that the first three lasted a generation or forty years. While the religious wave began in 1979 and continues today.

With wave David C. Rapoport hints that they are a cycle of events in a certain period of time, in which there are phases, such as those of contraction and expansion, being phases in which a large number of states can occur News that a series of groups (which we will call) terrorists repeat actions given to the definition of terrorism. Such as acts against civilians, destruction of public property, murders, kidnappings and other acts against key objectives in a systematic, premeditated, organized manner carried out with a final objective in mind, thus committing that subsequent patterns continue to appear for a generation from terrorism to the other, to which it can be clarified that all these waves, although for different purposes, all have that common impetus that allows a large number of people or groups to take well-defined, thought-out mutual acts, and in order of generating change, pressure, or directly taking control of power.

Modern terror, unlike its predecessor, has been well defined by the waves, however, prior to these effects in 1879 (Beginning of the anarchist wave) it was not as well delimited as it can be done now and precisely with the waves of terrorism, since before there were no well-structured groups or organizations with ends in mind as in modern terrorism, but before those people who called themselves *freedom fighters* They were people who made a stir and a mass of "tumults" to fight, the problem of those who tried to maintain their ideals with this type of philosophy was that their idea did not transcend, since by fulfilling the delimited end the influence to the one that was sought to be reached, for example the Ku Klux Klan, since for Rapoport, this type of terrorism, "ended with the attempt to totally liberate the blacks and expel the groups from the north of the south; They were successful, but they were American groups and their influence was specific to their time and their country. They had no successors." (Rapoport, 2002)

Thus, in order to fight terrorism, it is necessary to cut its ideals at the root, or to ask why people do not get involved with it. Because when transcending to international spheres, this will take on vital importance in the world framework, allowing it to connect with other groups with the same ideals and thus set higher goals. Since, as has been stated, terrorism requires being interconnected with those horizontal groups that have the same vision, this being one of the great clauses of the cycles of terrorism, the interconnection between the devotees of the ideas circulating in the established period.

According to David C. Rapoport (Rapoport, 2002) both al-Qaeda and ISIS will expand through new branches in the next wave. To which Rapoport brings historical elements to strengthen its position, since IRA, a leftist group in the sixties and the PLO also modified its scheme to adopt religious positions, since these elements were not part of its objectives.

David also alludes to the fact that the groups associated with pro-nationalist objectives are those that have the longest longevity, being that, also in the modern wave of terrorism, this being the religious one, nationalism makes its appearance as it is noted in Hamas, for example, both in Algeria as in Chechnya, since for (Rapoport, 2002) "International organizations disappear before internal organizations." A pivotal point in determining terrorism was the fact that in the sixties a cluster of new left-wing organizations envisioned their birth, yet on average they had a two-year longevity, which, while not long, were born with enough strength and momentum to generate secular movements, they served as martyrs for the generation of new successor organizations, "and when their energy can no longer inspire new organizations then the wave disappears." (Rapoport, 2002) To which, for government entities and control agencies, recognizing the precursor roots of generations and the changes in them, are crucial to understanding how to cope with the wave, developing strategies and movements regarding change of perception in it.

These being the four waves of terrorism, which describe what in the first wave, each of the states involved was greatly affected within their police organizations, being that the police had to learn infiltration tactics and dress up civilians to be able infiltrate illegal groups, as happened with "The Fenians" in Ireland (Group created because the motivation of those who appealed for the revolution against the state power was no longer monarchical or anarchist, but nationalist and separatist). Ireland once in command of Great Britain for centuries of history, there was always that atmosphere of rebellion, independence and resentment on the part of the command of England under the image of regional integration, who supported in their displeasure towards the leadership of the time, The massive migration resulting from population expansionism to the United States and the recent constant failure of potato crops, resulting in the nation's famine, supported those who most disgusted with events created the organization of "The Fenians" who as a result of a large number of acts against the current state regime such as the kidnapping of the Prince of Wales, invading Canada and being the minds that orchestrated a popular uprising in Ireland, managed to produce the first effect of the waves terrorism, which as mentioned above was the modification or restructuring of the p Policies by the police to confront or confront those subversive groups.

For Michael Walzer, professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University, terrorism does not only involve the social activities that are the object of the act, such as the death of the civilian population, but as a set of events for which "nobody plans a criminal wave: this is the result of thousands and thousands of decisions and actions, each independent of the other." (Walzer, 2002) Subject of this planning, it is concluded that terrorism "is the result of invisible hands: an organizational project, a strategic choice, a conspiracy to murder and intimidate" (Walzer, 2002), this demonstrates that announced by Hoffman that terrorism is carried out by conscious and rational entities that seek to generate terror in the civilian population with pressure objectives in the government in office.

Why is it necessary to mention all this? It is necessary because in order to understand how religious terrorism has worked in both the Middle East and its transgression of ideals in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to identify the emergence of each wave to identify at what point in history and for what reasons it began in the ASEAN member countries, how they took part in the daily activities of terrorist groups in these countries, about their ideals to be able to confront the problem at the root, and finally to understand how their decline could be, and as already mentioned How generally do these groups, when they see their decline, or at the end of the cycle, move on to new ideals (As was the case of the IRA-Irish Republican Army and OLP-Palestine Liberation Organization) to be able to get closer to the way in which they could according to the international effects, start with new ideals, thus generating a new wave of terrorism. “A terrorist group always follows an appropriate pattern, perhaps because it is inspired by the victory of a small group against the giant.” (Rapoport, 2002) For this very reason that terrorist groups always remain firm to what has been learned by relevant in previous times, is what is necessary to understand them in order to confront them.

## **1.6 Methodological Framework**

### **1.6.1 Research Method**

The research method used to better develop the problem statement, development of the frame of reference and for the response to the object product of study in the research, was the deductive method. Since it deals with what is terrorism (Macro) to be able to really focus on those terrorist acts and organizations in Southeast Asia and once the macro has been solved and thus manage to respond to the objectives set out in the investigation.

The research focus will be Qualitative, as it seeks to observe specific non-generalizable data that allow scenarios to be projected under the framework of a dynamic reality, in which each area generates different variables for the solution of the conflict. In addition, books, reports, studies, minutes, newspapers, press, and scientific magazines were required for the collection of information. However, this does not make it exempt from relying on specific data, in order to establish generalizations regarding the measurement of how these terrorist groups in Southeast Asia have functioned in the past and thus be able to make prospective projections based on data from financing, events, statistics.

The type of study used is the applied-explanatory one.

Applied because the existing theories and concepts will start to understand what is really the focus of the research, the focal points, those terms, definitions, plot developments that allow us to focus on what is relevant to the research and in this way get out of the *Status Quo* about terrorism.

Explanatory because the subject in question was previously addressed in order to know it, describe it, identify relevant variables and thus pass the exploratory and descriptive depth levels, thus reaching the explanatory level to identify the behavior of the determining variables in development. of the objectives.

### **1.6.2 Research methodology**

Since the research focus is a qualitative approach, the main sources of information collection were scientific journals, books, reports, studies, minutes, newspapers and press. Although they will also be equally relevant, the statistical models of Southeast Asian countries such as the indices, data, indicators, surveys already prepared and presented by the different entities of these countries and population censuses.

Since the research will be of a qualitative type, the main technique for presenting information will be the analysis, development and background that will lead to the issue in question, considering the development of the product of the research, thus seeking to provide an answer



to the established objectives. The information will be presented in writing, although during the course of the investigation, graphics will be used to describe and show the different events, effects, and ways of developing the subject under investigation over time.

The researcher agrees that the results will not be forced or modified, but that the information will be used correctly.

The information presented in the research comes from verified secondary sources, such as scientific articles, books, scientific journals, reports, magazines. Information will also be obtained from primary sources such as databases from the countries under study, government statistics from them, ministries, banks, population control organizations, CIA, UN, WTO, ASEAN, World Bank, IMF. All this in order to avoid false information, of yellowing news, misinterpretations, plot gaps, conflicting information, opinions and lack of objectivity. In order to keep both the ethics of the research result and the ethics of the researcher intact.

### **1.7 Scopes**

The present investigation is determined in the space after the terrorist attack from 9/11 until 2019 where Southeast Asia will be the central axis of the object to be investigated.

## **2. Research Development**

### **2.1 ASEAN and the problem of terrorism: an overview**

Terrorism in the midst of the 2016 annual Shangri-La dialogue was again a topic of interest, as what “ was the top security issue concerns Southeast Asia ” (Greer & Watson, 2016). This comes as no surprise to anyone because Southeast Asia maintains its constant relationship with terrorist groups and attacks mainly in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. I already mentioned it well (Kern, 2005) “Many of these groups threaten the status quo of the region by trying to create independent Islamic states in Muslim-majority areas ... Islamic terrorism is of the first order threatening the stability of Southeast Asia. ”

When observing the development of terrorism in Southeast Asia, the fact that the groups formed in this sector, such as Abu Sayyaf, Moor Islamic Liberation (MILF), Laskar Jihad, Pembela Islam Front, Jemaah Islamiya, Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia, is well known. had support from the already axes of terrorism worldwide, Al Qaeda and ISIS.

To talk about what ASEAN has done as an organization to confront terrorism, it is necessary to know the measures that this organization has developed, in addition to the individual movements of the countries of Southeast Asia.

The history in the development of terrorism in Southeast Asia for the impact that it currently has at the international level, has been broken down since the United States defeated Al Qaeda, being that it knew that the battle would not end there. Southeast Asia would become another important front against terror, having the country with the largest Muslim population (Indonesia) and “and two other countries with groups that threaten to establish fundamentalist Islamic theocracies (Philippines and Malaysia)” (Pasicolan & Dillon, 2001)

When talking about Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia from 1999 to 2019, it is necessary to understand that there are two fundamental pillars in the development of the investigation. Terrorist groups and their actions, and on the other hand, the participation of ASEAN as an organization to deal with these measures against terrorism.

Subsequent to the events of 9/11, ASEAN has to be taken as the organization in the fight against terrorism, in the case of “ Abu Sayyaf Group ” (ASG) the importance of controlling them is due to the instability that these present for Southeast Asia, since the ASG not only carries out acts of terror in terms of promoting its jihadist agency, but also bases its fundraising on these acts, since They carry out kidnappings, illegal human trafficking and other activities in order to collect commission, ransoms and other money from both

embassies and international organizations to ensure the release of people. An example of this was in April 2000, the year in which a fraction of the association kidnapped 21 people, among whom were “10 Westerners, from a tourist center in Malaysia” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2014), in 2001 it happened in May, the month in which they kidnapped three Americans and 17 Filipinos, who were taken from a tourist center this time in Palawan Philippines, in this act, they murdered several hostages, including one of the Americans, these were kidnapped for a long period of time since the next incident of the international attention group, was when in June 2002, one of the only two hostages who died in “a crossfire between the Philippine soldiers and the ASG.” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2014) Already in 2004, the Abu Sayyaf group bombed a ferry in Manila, killing 116 people on the spot, continuing with Manila, on February 14, 2005 in two cities in Manila they carried out simultaneous attacks, the object of these attacks, 8 people died and wounded 150. In 2006, a fraction of the group, led by Janjalani, moved to Sulu, “where he joined forces with local ASG supporters who were providing refuge to fugitive JI members from Indonesia.” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2014) Following the order of events, in July 2007, they joined a MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) force to jointly confront Philippine Marines on Basilian Island, as a result of this confrontation 14 Marines died, but did not stop there Since the same year, specifically in November 2007, a motorcycle that was loaded with a bomb exploded in front of the Philippine Congress, in this act they assassinated a congressman and three public employees. Jumping into 2009, not only did they perpetrate acts against national organizations, but they “kidnapped three International Red Cross workers in Sulu province, detaining one of the hostages for six months.” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2014) Starting in the 2010s, the greatest acts in which the group was involved were towards them, being that in February 2010, Philippine Marines assassinated one of the most dangerous, violent, and commanded sub commanders of Abu Sayyaf, Albared Parad, this happened on the island of Jolo, however, in 2011 Abu Sayyaf kidnapped some civilians asking for ransom. In 2012, acts similar to those of 2010 were carried out, and in February Philippine forces carried out an air attack on a camp of the terrorist organization in Jolo, an act in which they assassinated the leader of the group Abu Sayyaf Gumbahali Jumdal. After the death of their leader, the news would not improve for this group since, under pressure from the military, the group released an Australian who was held hostage for 15 months, this happened in March 2013, following With the scheme that the situation would become tense for the stability of the group, “in June 2014, the Philippine authorities arrested the figure of ASG Khair in the Manila subway.” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2014)

The Abu Sayyaf group is specifically mentioned, since these are the most relevant to the environment of terrorism in Southeast Asia, they are considered the most violent of the Islamic separatist groups, however, the scenario does not improve by varying the group to which is studied.

But, although the temporality of the study focuses on more contemporary years, it is necessary to point out that ASEAN as an organization had already outlined the importance of terrorism for regional integration, since, since 1992, several images were created that would present a vital axis to the time to confront, control, reduce or carry out the due intelligence in favor of defense against terrorist groups in the region.

Thanks to this scenario, the images created by ASEAN would create a set of policies that would define in a common way all the member countries of the organization. An example of this is when in 1992 the ASEAN Heads of State decided to prospectively raise issues of security and regional cooperation, since their vision was broadened beyond what was then within the framework of ASEAN, with this, they accentuated what would become the basis for the subsequent creation in 1994 of control bodies by which the diplomacy and organizational structure of ASEAN would be internationally recognized, these would be the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF, which presents itself as a new organization that welcomes 23 countries with different models, in (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017) they are presented exactly as “different statuses”. The new organization aims to transfer the constant dialogue that was born through ASEAN, but in the Asian environment, this given that the organization (ASEAN) became a role model or reference for the continent in terms of security. And it should also be brought up to the security issue that in 1997 the “Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” was signed (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017), this treaty broadened the vision that ASEAN was “a further step towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts” (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017)

Why is the above important? Well, in order to recognize the way in which ASEAN as an organization has become a focus of peace and most importantly for the issue in question, which ASEAN is recognized for its “peaceful resolution of conflicts.” Historically, ASEAN operates as an organization. 3 pillars, which are the objective of integration, these being “ASEAN Security Community- ASC”, ASEAN Economical Community-AEC “and ASEAN Socio Cultural Community-ASC” which allow non-member countries to follow the model of the ARF or the previously mentioned “ASEAN Regional Forum.”

However, as it was mentioned in the state of the art by Percival, these subversive groups outside the law are achieving their objectives which (Being terrorists) must be linked to the axis of gaining support and empathy in the population, distorting the state and controlling high impact economies such as drug trafficking, and also the allusion made by the Acharya referring to which ASEAN as an organization, although it manages security within its pillars and bases, have not been able to organize themselves completely due to the different positions to the vision of “non-interference”. These two perspectives allow us to open up a question. So, why is ASEAN taken as an example of conflict resolution?

For their peace agreements and treaties.

“Asia was the continent with the highest percentage of cases in which direct negotiation occurred without the participation of third parties.” (asiae, 2018)

Counting the Philippines alone, there were 3 peace process negotiations, between the Philippines and the MILF, the government and MNLF (A fraction of MILF led by Nur Misuari) and between the government and NDF. However, after months of violating the ceasefire between the NDF or the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Government, the latter term additionally cataloging them with the NPA or New People's Army as terrorists, which is why we typecast them here. Additionally, in Thailand there was a negotiation with BRN or Barisan Revolusi Nasional which was satisfactory, although this already came with a process since 2013.

However, Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines, mentioned at the ASEAN summit on November 13, 2017 that “terrorism threatens peace in Asia” (El diario. Manila, 2017)

in which issues related to jihadism and drug trafficking were mentioned which jeopardize “the economic prosperity and integrity of the institutions and, more importantly, the security of our people,” said Duterte. “Jihadists from the Islamic State occupied the city of Marawi, in the southern Philippines, between May and October of this year, that terrorist group has followers in Indonesia and Malaysia, two countries with a Muslim majority in ASEAN.” (El diario. Manila, 2017). According (ECHO, 2015) 259,200 people had been affected by the crisis caused by terrorism, with 162,000 requiring assistance from the state in the Philippines only on 2015.

Within the ASEAN member states, it is possible to differentiate two different perspectives on American interventionism, being these extremes. Singapore as the greatest defender of the policies and measures carried out by the United States in the War of Terror, and on the other side of the coin is Indonesia, who, as will be seen later, has not been so perceptive to the measures carried out against the Terrorism by the United States, even knowing that several terrorist attacks have been carried out in Indonesia and two of the most recognized and influential in the region, these being both attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005.

Singapore in terms of security, is an easy case, since US policies have had a high impact on the security of terrorism in this. Therefore the Singapore government is named by Febrica (Febrica, *Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 2010) as the “main audience in the securitization process.” On the other side of the coin, as mentioned above, is Indonesia, where “due to political circumstances, the government response is not as strong as in Singapore. “In the case of Indonesia, the government plays two roles: as an audience and as

a communicator for national constituents.” (Febrica, *Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia*, 2010)

Here you can see the parallelism between the positions taken by different members of ASEAN. For what, the scenario between Indonesia and Singapore, the pro-war extremes against the American terror and that member of ASEAN more against the same figure is evident.

Figure 1 Abu Sayyaf attacks in the Philippines during 2013-2014




Source. (CNN Philippines Staff, 2016)

It is implied that although the sector where terrorist groups are usually established is known, local governments have not been able to control the situation, this is due to several factors such as the lack of an iron fist on the part of them, the determination regarding the measures against terrorists and the lack of prioritization of the subject regarding the cultural image that could be generated in the population, since, it is necessary to bear in mind that the population of the region is in its great Muslim majority.




Figure 2 Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines



Source. (DW, 2017)

It is notable how the same places where attacks have already been carried out are constantly repeated. However, this determines in the first instance why the appropriate measures have not been taken to prevent attacks. Since, although it is complex to estimate where a new attack will be located, it is possible to take measures in recurring areas for illegal activities such as drug trafficking or terrorism.


Figure 3 Terrorist incidents in Southeast Asia for 2016-2018



Source. (The Asean Post, 2019)




Figure 4 Map of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia



Source. (Xun Zhang, 2018)

Figure 5 Map of deaths from terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.



Source. (Xun Zhang, 2018)

These are the areas where terrorists have attacked in Southeast Asia with impacts that generated international attention.


From the two images previously referenced, it can be seen that generally terrorist attacks do not always have the objective of murdering people, it may be the effect of one of the principles of terrorism mentioned in the theoretical framework, in which it was defined that terrorism seeks objectives deterrence against power, either through joint fear in the

population, or failing social pressure to demonstrate the absence of power by the state in a specific sector.

It is also noted that the sites where terrorist intelligence has been perpetrated are often recurring.

It turns out that the group from which the two previous images were obtained, developed a statistical route and research a map in which the places most prone to terrorist attacks are predicted, thanks to which solutions, measures and initiatives could be proposed to attack this and reduce its influence in the sector.

*Figure 6 Terrorist attack risk map.*



Source. (Xun Zhang, 2018)

What criticisms have been made of the ASEAN process against terrorism?

By reviewing the databases, reports, news and studies on the subject. It has been concluded that the sources taken as a guide for the development of the investigation repeatedly raise possible shortcomings in the ASEAN way of dealing with terrorism, taking into account the threat that the absence of determinism with it poses for the region.

The most reiterative of the assertions that can be appreciated regarding the process that ASEAN has maintained against terrorist groups is that, one of the most important agreements for the fight against terrorism, is the Cebu agreement, this is born out of necessity. to end

terrorist attacks like the one in the Philippines in 2007 in which 7 people die in the south of the country. However, this is where the criticisms can be presented, since what the Cebu agreement really raises is non-interference, with which the peaceful resolution of conflicts is being sought. In addition to this, when attempts have been made to take charge of the matter, it has been too slow, since not only is ASEAN slow in the production of policies to counter terrorism, but it is also slow in ratification and the process to be able to implement ideals. “Regional governments have struggled to demonstrate their collective capacity to act as an effective diplomatic community and security regime.” (Haacke, 2003)

The country that has had the most trouble with terrorist attacks, the Philippines, is found to have carried out a military attack on Abu Sayyaf in 2017. “The Philippine military has launched airstrikes against a group that threatens to behead a German man. The deadline for the delivery of a ransom of 566,000 euros has passed without updates.” (DW, 2017) Being that after this intervention, the situation regarding deterrence, I raise the Philippine government, to the advantage of the negotiations. In this scenario, it was argued that the lack of determinism in the rest of the ASEAN member countries has led to situations of a similar nature resulting in tragedy.

ASEAN should act proactively (as in the previous case, the Philippines did) and not reactively since efficient policies against terrorism require linearity, for which it is necessary to “Anticipate and evolve in accordance with the current transformations and trends of terrorism” (Borelli, 2020) being that equally for (Rohan, 2005) ASEAN has not generated satisfactory responses to the threat of terrorism, to which it states that “The Indonesian response after the first terrorist incident in Bali in 2002 was strong, but insufficient” (Rohan, 2005), given that although intelligence data was available to anticipate the second attack on October 1, 2005, Indonesian watchdogs and authorities did not anticipate the threat, although they had sufficient data to do so, according to Rohan, " they did not adequately respond to the threat " and Rohan also believes that ...

*Success in preventing terrorist attacks is the best yardstick to measure the functionality of a counterterrorism strategy. Bali II highlighted Indonesia's lack of understanding of the magnitude of the threat and the inability of its government to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight a rapidly growing jihadist movement in the country. This second attack in Bali also demonstrated Indonesia's continued lack of anti-terrorism leadership and its lack of investment in developing adequate legislation, training and intelligence. (Rohan, 2005)*

The impact generated by ASEAN as a group to confront terrorism, in addition to the agreements and security measures, there are also joint negotiations, such as the negotiation of Indonesia and Japan in 2003, in which they developed 7 determining points for the security of the region in an Agreement to Combat Terrorism, these being “immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, police enforcement and measures against terrorist financing. Such a framework agreement considers in a clause that both countries deepen cooperation in ASEAN and APEC.” (Malacalza, 2004)... and as they

proposed, it was finally carried out, however, regarding diplomacy, the policy taken by ASEAN as an organization is successful, lacks determining power and command force, because the member states of the organization seek to intervene as little as possible within of an action plan that is strongly criticized, being what another problem for conflict resolution is what, within the member states, national policies prevent the creation of regional policies according to the real impact that terrorism generates in the area. “The existence of weak states in the region, which are taken advantage of by terrorist networks, increases the concern of the United States.” (Malacalza, 2004)

Within the Declaration on Terrorism of the 8th ASEAN Summit, it was warned in the Second point that the use of terror against human life and society, without affecting the place, the cause or the name of the aspiration object of the same terrorist activity is denounced, and also the (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan , 2002) deplores the average in terms of continuity of terrorists related to or based on religious or ethnic groups.

Which offers nothing beyond that is common to all states. Even with this in point 6, the congress refers to why tourists should avoid visiting their countries, due to the lack of evidence to deal with rumors of possible terrorist attacks, yet another approach to lack of control and power what do these countries handle in the face of the situation. Finally, point 7 presents the international community to support ASEAN from its efforts to combat terrorism and “Restore business confidence in the region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan , 2002) being what they request international cooperation.

Another effect that is mentioned both in the 2002 United Nations Security Council and in the ASEAN memorandum is that there is a strong lack of prevention against terrorism, radicalization, recruitment and recidivism of common factors such as evolution. of the groups and the force used, since the unresolved conflicts based on territories attract terrorists as they are “no man's land”.

The United Nations Security Council states that the focal points that need to be paid attention to are:

1. Foreign terrorist fighters.
2. Criminal justice and legislation.
3. Fight against the financing of terrorism.
4. Compliance with Law and Border Control.
5. Fight against recruitment and measures to prevent and combat violent extremism.
6. Protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism.
7. Strategies and mechanisms for rehabilitation and reintegration. (Consejo de Seguridad , 2016)

However, the Security Council itself raises what AS “ASEAN... has put useful tools on its website. but, ASEAN member states have not fully utilized either the Treaty or the website ... There is no regional agreement on extradition.” (Consejo de Seguridad , 2016)

*ASEAN allows visa free movement within the region... many Member States are transit and destination States for ISIL fighters... South East Asian States are increasingly aware of the need to improve their border management* (Consejo de Seguridad , 2016)

The problems that ASEAN presents as an organization in the fight against terrorism have already been raised, which, although they seem few, generate a great repercussion and for this reason, as mentioned in the state of the art, was the United States made the decision to intervene in the process of countering terrorism in Southeast Asia.

In 2016 the Islamic State or Daesh has used direct propaganda to those Muslims of Southeast Asia to recruit them from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to join the effort in the war in Iraq and Syria, being a wave of armed jihad in its own region, this IS's approach to Southeast Asia shows beyond the capacity of the group and of the movement that requires the change of agenda a total incompetence on the part of the states to directly face terrorism, being that although the objective is to obtain the approval of the people, they are doing it with a too soft policy in which the interference of terrorist groups is allowed ... the non-interference that the states claim is being taken advantage of by the groups outside the law.

It is not sensible to think that the ASEAN member countries fail to learn from the recurrence of attacks with similar conditions on the territory of the member countries.

Although in these meetings between the leaders of the ASEAN member countries, topics of vital importance for the security of the area are discussed, it continues to reiterate the need to improve security, cooperation and the improvement of instruments to respond to threats. It does not touch any point other than the one that has been taking place since the Bali attack in October 2002. It always reacts the same way to the threat of terrorism and apparently that does not pose to be changed, which is why it resorted to that a third party with broad military power could confront those groups the countries would not attack, which is the United States. And also, continuing the perspective, according to the scientific journal *Artibus Asiae* there was an evolution regarding the peace negotiations, in some cases, some meetings were held with significant impact, however, they mention that in the “majority of contexts there is significant progress was recorded, and in none of them was there any definitive, global or structural agreement” (*asiae*, 2018), being that specifically in the case of the Philippines, the fact that differently from what was expected in the three peace accords, none really had a relevant effect and evolution was criticized in the same magazine publication, being that in terms of government negotiation With the Communist Party of the Philippines “throughout the year, trust between the parties deteriorated, with repeated violations and interruptions of

the ceasefire, until at the end of 2017, Manila concluded the negotiating process.” (asiae, 2018)

The reiteration of the clear factor in view that is the non-resolution of conflicts or the taking of pertinent measures for the prevention of the effects of terror.

For ASEAN, the need to cooperate against terrorism was identified in what is known as the ‘Transnational Crime Declaration’, since it was adopted on December 20, 1997, in which the organization sought to expand the vision of the fight against terrorism and increase efforts against transnational crime as terrorism was for ASEAN, with this declaration it was achieved that the seriousness of solving the issue of terrorism was brought to light, however as mentioned above in the investigation the lack of acts on the part of the organization will be noticed again, since the following are the conclusions of the declaration of transnational crime:

1. Strengthen cooperation.
2. Meet every 2 years to coordinate relevant activities.
3. Hold discussions.
4. Consider the establishment of the Transnational Crime Center in ASEAN.
5. Meet with experts.
6. Give value to the police to facilitate cooperation.
7. Give value to the network of national agencies for information exchange.
8. Expand the vision of member countries against transnational crime and terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms sales, money laundering, human trafficking and piracy.
9. Explore ways in which members can work more deeply together.
10. Cooperate and coordinate more closely with other ASEAN members
11. Strengthen the capacity of the ASEAN secretariat to assist members of the organization to propose, coordinate activities, strategies and programs to combat transnational crime.

These points taken from the same 1997 ASEAN statement (ASEAN, 1997)

At the dawn and peak of terrorism as a world first on 9/11, ASEAN made the declaration to join the action against terrorism, the declaration was adapted on November 5, 2001. Taking up again, the main objective of The declaration of Intent to Action Against Terrorism was to strengthen regional cooperation, with information or intelligence being shared, as well as regional practices and efforts against terrorism.



In 2002, ASEAN continued with the Work Program to Combat Transnational Crime, which was adopted on May 17, 2002, in which the operational guide for regional cooperation was generated, being what, in addition to achieving objectives and actions, what They were identified in the statement Entering Action Against Terrorism in 2001, which led to this being reiterated in 2002, now following the famous terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia and the Philippines, in which 216 people died and were seriously injured 419.

In addition, to the aforementioned ASEAN convention against terrorism, it was adopted on January 13, 2007 with the objective of strengthening regional efforts against terrorism. Before its adoption, there was disagreement within ASEAN because it was discussed whether or not a regional convention was needed, because there were already international instruments in which allusion was made against terrorism in which there was reference to obligations created by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 1373 which dictated that:

1. *States prevent, repress financing of all acts of terrorism, freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or resources, criminalize the intentional provision or collection of funds to perpetrate acts of terrorism.*
2. *States refrain from providing active or passive support to people involved in terrorism, deny shelter to those who finance, plan or commit acts of terrorism, ensure the prosecution of anyone who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of acts of terrorism. (United Nations, 2001)*

At the January 2003 summit against terrorism in Jakarta, it was agreed that each ASEAN member country should establish a task force against terrorism in the fight against it and collaborate with those affected after an attack occurs.

As already mentioned, ASEAN has different positions regarding the achievement of objectives in the fight against terrorism. In order to do this, some ASEAN member countries have made sub-regional announcements in order to improve border security and combat subversive activities at common borders. In May 2002, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines signed the information exchange agreement and the Establishment of communication procedures to improve cooperation in fighting transnational crime, including terrorism.

Likewise, the ARF or ASEAN Regional Forum has mainly proposed measures against the financing of terrorism, which is where the ARF ISM CT-TC or ARF Meeting Between Sessions on Country Terrorism and Transnational Crime was born, which was held in Sabah in March 2003.

ASEAN +3 also proposed cooperation against the threats of terrorism and transnational crime, being the group with the support of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, in

which more reference is made to maritime piracy and the security of the China Sea. Training and joint work are also done.

UN- CTC. The ASEAN secretary participated in the committee of the United Nations Security Council against terrorism in New York in March 2003, being that the agenda of the event was presented for 3 main topics:

- *Global standard on the fight against terrorism.*
- *The role of regional and sub-regional organizations in strengthening global capacity against terrorism.*
- *The role of international and regional organizations in assistance, including gaps in the provision of counter-terrorism assistance.*

*At the request of UN-CTC, the Secretariat identified some areas in counter-terrorism activities where assistance is required:*

- *Legislative drafting on the fight against terrorism and the suppression of terrorist financing;*
- *Drafting of a possible regional convention against terrorism.*
- *Establish a database on terrorism and other transnational crimes (to include legislation, studies and reports on transnational crimes)*
- *Fight against biological terrorism. (ASEAN, 2003)*

ASEAN and China had a meeting on November 4, 2002 in which ASEAN leaders and the Chinese Prime Minister came together on the issue of non-traditional security, being that terrorism was taken at this meeting, being that for China terrorism was a priority in cooperation with ASEAN. The result of this were to identify and prioritize potential areas for action and the adoption of communication measures.

“ASEAN and Europe signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism which was issued in Brussels on January 28, 2003.” (ASEAN, 2003) Here the search for technologies and techniques to combat money laundering, the development of FIU or Financial Intelligence Units, the exchange of experts in banking regulation between the parties, the development of software that was capable of identifying suspicious transactions, although for To implement this cooperation, the European Commission agreed to create a mechanism whose mission of assistance to ASEAN under the name of RRM or Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

ASEAN and the United States signed the aforementioned Joint Declaration of Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on August 1, 2002, being that the United States, unlike the rest of its allies, seeks to prevent, dismantle, break in and fight terrorism through exchange intelligence, information and development assistance, such as when advising or



training personnel. The United States in the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration of Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism is interested in highlighting the fact that in order to improve connections, it was necessary to work in the areas of “information exchange, capacity building via education, transportation, border and migration control, in addition to developing the capacities and legal, financial regulatory, financial intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution institutions to combat terrorist financing.” (ASEAN, 2003)

This leaves us as a theme that some efforts in ASEAN member countries are due to organizations external to themselves, such as Interpol training in Cambodia forces to confront terrorism, being that, in 2014, Interpol carried out “23 Against terrorist’s forces, immigration, and officials of the National Central Offices (OCN-BCN s). from Interpol to Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam” (Interpol, 2015) Since then 280 people trained until November 2015, the year the news was published. In addition, for the trainings, 20 delegates from the different high-level police agencies of the ASEAN member countries had a meeting on November 19, 2015, with the aim of clarifying issues relevant to future development and strengthening in terms of border management, in addition, in order to carry out prospective strategies to expand international cooperation in the fight to resolve the issue of terrorism. “Delegates included heads of immigration, counter-terrorism, and INTERPOL NCBs from participating countries.” (Interpol, 2015)

In this news, the intention of the United States to carry out its War of Terror policy against terrorists in Southeast Asia is well known, real intervention and progress in the fight against terrorism in ASEAN is noted, however, this does not happen on initiative proper to the organization but because an external entity enters to intervene in the situation. Although, that is just what the investigation intends, not only to see both positive actions, such as the shortcomings of ASEAN as an organization to be able to counter terrorism, but also to see those interventions by the United States to be able to confront the growing Islamic terrorism in the Southeast Asian.

In 2018, the ASEAN member countries sought to improve their ties in terms of what terrorism is, being that the ASEAN countries are calling for a Collective Approach, in which they seek to evolve the way to counter the threat that it represents to the sovereignty of countries and the region terrorism, however it is stated that for this they are strengthening resilience against terrorism, appealing to appropriate measures to counter them, increasing militarization in the areas they are in, acquiring advanced technologies, exploring areas in which ASEAN can cooperate against illegal groups, strengthening their capacities against cyber terrorism to gain the necessary momentum to equip themselves adequately to confront them. Since, according to the United Nations, the regionals “Meeting of ASEAN Ministers on Transnational Crime and the Meeting of Senior Officials on Transnational Crime were part of the main regional activities.” (Naciones Unidas , 2019)

Singapore was the volunteer to act as Senior Coordinator for Cybercrime, and for this, Singapore proposed initiatives to prevent and generate response by ASEAN members against these cybercrime acts, a result of the volunteering of Singapore to project the cybercrime security scheme was the ASEAN + 3 Conference (these three countries being South Korea, Japan and China) and a “fifth Round Table of ASEAN + 3 Senior Officials on Cybercrime, in July 2018.” (United Nations, 2019)

In addition to this, it is stated by the United Nations that “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is vital to maintain international peace and security and combat global threats such as climate change and the spread of terrorism.” (United Nations, 2020)

The scenario is set for ASEAN security from 2018 to the future 2025 by the United Nations as follows.

*We have joined ASEAN's efforts to implement the ASEAN Convention on the Fight against Terrorism and the ASEAN Action Plan to Prevent and Combat the Increase in Radicalization and Violent Extremism for the period 2018-2025.* (United Nations, 2019)

It is important to mention that the United Nations, in cooperation with ASEAN, mentions that “ASEAN can address emerging non-traditional security challenges by fighting terrorism and violent extremism, cybercrime and illicit drug trafficking.” (United Nations, 2020) This point is vital, since it sets out from the United Nations the scenario to be followed by ASEAN to confront terrorism.

In conclusion, we have which ASEAN has obtained good allies in terms of obtaining information and resources, whether they are learning or training as a team to fight terrorism, however, it has not taken the time to really take positions against this.

## **2.2 United States political and economic initiatives against terrorism in Southeast Asia from 1998 to 2018.**

The vision that the United States raises regarding the Southeast Asian scenario is important, since “even with the existence of new international powers in the economic field, the geopolitical position of the United States still remains quite relevant.” (Strobel, Praj, & Bernal, 2019)

The attention of the United States for the second front against terrorism begins with the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, now the radical Islamists of Southeast Asia have recognized their connections with the Al Qaeda terrorist network, since for more than a decade Al Qaeda entered the region to establish the so-called cells, they also trained local extremists in Afghanistan and also financed those extremist Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been the most vulnerable to those anti-American groups. However, Singapore has been, albeit harmed, although not to the degree of the Philippines and Indonesia, presents a tentative driving force regarding the control and eradication of terrorism in the region.

Purpose of this, after 9/11, the United States sought to position itself in Southeast Asia by “promoting multilateral dialogue in ASEAN and APEC. In July 2002, the ASEAN countries signed an agreement for intelligence cooperation, detection of funds, and border control with the United States to combat terrorism.” (Malacalza, 2004)

In June 2002, the United States carried out joint policies with the Philippines with the aim of “dismantling the Abu Sayyaf group” (Malacalza, 2004), in addition to this, Singapore allowed the US Navy to dispose of its ports. The power strategy implemented by the United States, had the objective of ensuring their stay and access to ports and air availability in Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. However, in Southeast Asia there are some countries that the United States lists as “Weak States” (Malacalza, 2004) which are victims of terrorist networks, which take advantage of the absence of guidelines in the states to implement their activities. This type of network used by terrorist groups in Weak States increases US concern to take the lead on the War of Terror on the Second Front.

Taking into account the American concern, two countries in Southeast Asia are the ones to which the United States generates the most respect, due to the opposition of activities by US forces, these are Malaysia and Indonesia.

It is necessary to remember that Indonesia was the victim of the Bali attack on October 12, 2002, in which there were 202 deaths and this had an impact on the security of the important region, since, as of that date, “fear struck. to the statesmen of the area, even more, after

verifying the connection between Jemaah Islamiyah (Author of the Bali attacks) and Al Qaeda.” (Malacalza, 2004)

The United States to wage war on terrorism in Southeast Asia has exercised both military and soft power. President George W. Bush made a decisive call by mentioning that “ No nation can be neutral in the confrontation, or you are with us or you are against us ” (Bonner, 2003) additional in the same news, the reference of a US official in Southeast Asia, who warned that “It is not enough to be with us in the war against terrorism... you have to trumpet it” is brought up. The United States has intervened in the war on terror in Southeast Asia through financial support and military operations, as this is considered the Second Front. This is decisive based on why for the United States the countries of Southeast Asia have been very soft and ‘hospitable’ with the terrorists, being what “The first program of the United States government in the region was to give the government of the Philippines 100 million dollars in training assistance, military equipment and maintenance support to the Philippine armed forces.” (Barry Desker, 2002 Spring ).

In 2002, 606 US special forces soldiers were deployed to the southern Philippines to fight the Abu Sayyaf group.

Although the first American intervention was in the Philippines, within the investigation it has been highlighted that the ASEAN member countries have two different policies regarding the fight against terror. Singapore and Indonesia being the two extreme sides of the coin, where Singapore is closest to US intervention, while Indonesia prefers to distance itself from the War on Terror policies carried out by it.

But before looking directly at how the United States has applied its theory of Securization in which it applies both “military and non-military” power. (Febrica, 2010) it is necessary to delimit how the United States provided aid to Indonesia specifically, for which I not only try to quickly influence Indonesia to guarantee its commitment to the objective of the American War of Terror, but they generated a set of political movements in impulse economic for regional security, to which the American cabinet and those in charge of carrying out the American measures promised to carry out a restoration of the military aid that the United States provides to Indonesia, and that, in addition to financial aid for reforms, aid was also made physical, such as training and accompaniment, to which in total were 657.4 million US dollars in financial aid, which were distributed in \$ 400,000 to influence the population the perspective that was sought regarding the vision of terrorism ( Influence via promotion of images and data against radicalization), \$ 10 million to train the police to confront and prevent terrorists, \$ 130 million to finance reforms in criminal and judicial laws, \$ 10 million to be used “helping refugees in Maluku” (The Jakarta Post, 2001), 5 million dollars in public works, being these, the reconstruction of destroyed schools in Aceh, 2 million that were destined in aid for “the East Timorese who chose to stay in Indonesia” (The Jakarta Post, 2001), and as no one was surprised by the United States, \$ 400 million “to promote trade

and investment, especially in the oil and gas sector; as well as a \$ 100 million tax-free status for 11 Indonesian products under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).” (The Jakarta Post, 2001)

The United States, once the policy on the war on terror was invested in the countries of Southeast Asia for this purpose, it is necessary to point out that although the countries all received direct and indirect support in different measures, not all took the American vision. in the same way.

An example of this is Singapore, where the American vision of the fight against terror was pleasantly accepted, however, in more diplomatic countries in conflict resolution such as Indonesia, both parties, both government and policy, carefully designed the scheme to distance itself from the state struggle over the American War on Terror despite a series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, such as the Bali attack in 2002 and 2005 committed with suicide bombs, or the attacks on the Marriot hotel in Jakarta in 2003, or the car bomb attack outside the Australian embassy in 2004, finally those that occurred at the Marriot, Ritz and Carlton hotels in 2009.

To understand why Indonesia is so reactive to the policy the United States uses in the war on terror, it is necessary to mention that during the post-attack period of 9/11, the president of Indonesia at the time, Megawati Sukarnoputri, visited the leaders of American states where I affirm their intention of bilateral cooperation to face this threat. However, when the United States took the lead in implementing its ‘war of terror’ in post-invasion Iraq in Afghanistan, Indonesian President Megawati strongly criticized the US government for the use of brute force in its invasion of Iraq. In this regard, not only was the United States concerned about the position that the former president took at the time, but in the same period of time, government officials affirmed that the separatists were a stronger threat to national security than terrorism.

Object of the attack in Bali in October 2002 in which 202 people were killed. The Jemaah Islamiya operation network in the region came to light, after which more than 80 jihadists were captured and imprisoned. However, the figurative parity between opinions regarding the United States and Indonesia based on the government's position increased, this generated by “Indonesia's skepticism about the existence of a JI network there ... As a consequence, the perception of Indonesia's lack of seriousness in the war on terror.” (Official, 2008)

Because there is a strong political countermeasure in structuring ideological sources directly proportional to the American vision by the Indonesian government, he finds that the United States does not directly intend to eradicate these groups, being that it would be counterproductive to pose the image of ‘Good police - bad police’ regarding the influence on the population vulnerable to terrorist effects, in this case, Indonesia being the good and the United States the bad, and pragmatically, the scheme of terrorist participation in the Muslim

population raises a clear discord to the resolution of conflicts by the United States. This object of the possibility that the moderate Muslims as well stated on multiple occasions at the beginning of the investigation, begin to see the objectives of the fundamentalists as truthfully accepted due to the constant threat of ending them, thus giving the possibility to the moderate population to affirm the fundamentalist objectives for being persecuted. This would further increase the bad image that policies in the US War on Terror have in many of the countries of Southeast Asia, mainly Indonesia.

The objective of the United States towards terrorism in Southeast Asia is not to eradicate them as such, since it must be borne in mind that the majority of the population in the area are Muslims and would not be well regarded, with which “their goal is not win. It was not even clear what it meant to win. His goal was only to disrupt the Muslim world and turn it against itself, so that an Islamic empire would not emerge.” (Friedman, 2009) how it happened in the middle east.

According to (Harari, 2015) Terrorism is applied by those groups that lack social strength to demonstrate participation in a country's scheme, what he calls ‘a strategy of weakness’, being that, how did Bruce Hoffman propose regarding the definition and The terrorists' objective is to cause a political impact through the violation of those who lack the strength to fight, the civilian population, to which, the terrorists in their approach to operation, spread fear instead of making important material alterations, since they generally “do not have the necessary strength to defeat an army, occupy a country or destroy cities” (Harari, 2015), this is reflected in the fact that after the Bali attack in 2002, Jemaah Islamiya changed his tactics from targeting military or government facilities in western countries, to focus on so-called soft targets, such as conglomerate tourist places, western businesses or schools in the that the main population is from the west, an example of this is the bombing of the Marriot hotel in August 2003. This is important to understand the scheme as portrayed in this investigation, referring to the ideology of terror imparted by the United States towards the groups subversives, because the ideal of terrorist groups, as it has been well mentioned, is to obtain the support of the population or the fear of it. For the United States, this is very important, since, instead of carrying out a direct extermination, they operate so that they cannot obtain power, limiting their capacities and extending their visualization, in such a way that the population is warned of the capacity it possesses. the current world leader and his capacity so that the strength of these groups does not advance to their ideals.

So, to answer the question of what the operations have been carried out to confront these groups in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to bring up the importance of a due countermeasure of these anti-government groups, since, if the indicated measures were not taken, they could how it will become evident later destabilizing the population and making clear the inefficiency of the state to face the threats.



Regarding the aforementioned, the scenario arises that although the defenders of fundamentalist (or violent) Islam permeate how a minority in Southeast Asia, the constant US pressure and the presence of their armed forces in the region, can generate controversial images (Regarding the interests of the United States) regarding the terrorists, being what, the ideal was in 2003 to find the ideal way to confront them without “making them heroes or martyrs in the broader Islamic community of Southeast Asia.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

In an increasingly globalized world, in which according to the winner of the Nobel Prize and Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, “Arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity ” (Annan, 2000), alluding to the fact that the laws of connectivity and the evolution of networks, commerce and technology have started a process that will be unstoppable to connect people around the world. This connects with what was previously mentioned, since the importance of government groups' countermeasures to terrorists, although they influence regional positions, have a global impact, therefore the United States, although it is not immediately in the area subject to regional interference trade used by terrorist groups, becomes affected. As this is the nation that today has the most power and influence in international trade (Although it is not the one that generates the most merchandise movement), the determination and actions it takes to face trade obstacles are important. Bearing in mind the premise that the world is interconnected “Now we are witnessing some significant disadvantages that accompany globalization, such as the migration of terrorist fighters and transnational organized crime.” (Douglas, 2016) As Southeast Asia is also increasingly seeking integration from ASEAN, these problems have a growing impact, since, according to (Douglas, 2016) “Most middle-income and developing countries lack the systems and capabilities to address transnational threats”, with governments lagging behind in preventing and controlling cross-border movement. for non-legal purposes. Furthermore, for Douglas equally “regional and international organizations often have intentionally limited mandates and insufficient resources to provide a coherent response, leaving many countries and regions susceptible to transnational threats.” (Douglas, 2016)

This is important to the United States due to the high impact of Southeast Asia on the world economy. Furthermore “Terrorism is the most immediate and visible challenge... vulnerable and fragile states in the Middle East, Africa and Asia suffer the most from terrorist violence.” (Douglas, 2016)

However, The United States in Southeast Asia from 1999 to 2019 has implemented its War on Terror, which has been called “Fourth Generation War” (Lind, 2004), “Asymmetric War” (Thornton, 2007) and also called “Fourth World War” (Podhoretz, 2007) situation that really seeks to make a call regarding particularly new violence with respect to classical terrorism, transnational, international or global terrorism.

Among the official strategies applied by the United States in the fight against terrorism, one can find the American Patriot Act of 2001.

The purpose of the opening on the Jemaah Islamiya network was that members of it could be arrested in Thailand and Cambodia during the spring and summer of 2003, however, the same networks indicate why operations have intensified both in these two countries and in Laos and Burma.

During the period of the Bush administration, it pressured the countries so that all those suspected of participating in terrorist organizations were detained, to which the United States deployed more than 1,000 soldiers in the southern Philippines to fight Abu Sayyaf, being that they demanded in exchange intelligence. Additionally, they were responsible not only for training the Indonesian military forces, but also for the proposed restoration of International Military Education and Training (IMET).

Within Southeast Asia, in addition to the multilateral agreement against terror made by the United States and ASEAN, when individually observing, the responses of the countries regarding the American intervention were divided among those who were concerned about the threat of their own internal political stability, allowed the United States to enter with military forces, shared intelligence and repressed their own military groups so that the American forces had greater participation, these were Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines and those who were later in responding to the threats. In the case of Thailand and Indonesia, they only carried out these activities after the attacks and detention of members of the groups, which allowed us to glimpse the seriousness of the threat to the civilian population. Due to this, as previously mentioned, some governments observed the fact that American pressure and the increase of military forces in the region, could generate tension on issues of “political sensitivity with the main Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim majority states; The Philippines has a sizeable, historically alienated, separatist-minded Muslim minority.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

In 2003, an event of great importance occurred in terms of counter-terrorism cooperation, or in favor of regional security. The summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in Bangkok-Thailand in October 2003, in which Bush participated, in order to pressure the cooperation of regional allies and friends, being what the “regional leaders agreed to dismantle, fully and without delay, transnational terrorist groups.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) Also in the same year, it happened in August that the Southeast Asian Regional Counter-Terrorism Center established in Kuala Lumpur conducted the first anti-terrorism training. Towards the sovereignty of the United States, some leaders at the APEC summit emphasized their concerns regarding the United States, handling “security issues-including terrorism and Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs - with such priority and freedom. North - at the expense of trade and economic issues, which traditionally



dominate the APEC summits.’’ (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) During President Bush's trip to Southeast Asia, he visited the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, in which he stressed the importance of joint intelligence and cooperation against terrorism, apparently it had results, since in August 2003 he was detained Riduan Isamuddin who is an essential coordinator for the activities of Jemaah Islamiya and Al Qaeda, who was detained by Thai military forces acting with the help of the United States Intelligence Central (CIA). Following the events of terrorism in South East Asia in 2003, on September 3 of that year, a trial was held in Indonesia in which ‘‘Abu Bakar Baasyir was convicted of conspiring to overthrow the Indonesian government.’’ (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003), however, the most serious charges were dropped, in which it was also mentioned that he is the leader of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, for which he only had to pay 4 years in prison, since he had been asked by the prosecutors’ 15 years sentence.

The exchange of intelligence and contribution of military forces paid off in 2005 and 2009 as to why, in Malaysia the military forces eliminated terrorist leaders Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammad respectively, continuing with Malaysia, in 2015 100 people were arrested suspected of being involved in terrorist plots, among them was a person who was going to Kuala Lumpur to detonate an explosive.

Indonesia, with American support, has managed to imprison terrorists, although it is necessary to note that the sentences were not what the courts demanded.

In order to achieve long-term peace, it is necessary to note that imprisoning, murdering or generating pressure on those followers of the Islamist schools of thought will not eliminate the root problem, since, regarding the measures to be taken in order to retain and control the A base that generates terrorists, it is required that both the public and private that maintain anti-terrorist efforts join their intentions and actions to stop the root cause of radicalization, if not, the cycles of terror will persist. To explain this phenomenon, no other action is required than a glimpse of Indonesian prisons, which studies show how ‘‘poorly supervised and staffed, which have become pockets of radicalization.’’ (Greer & Watson, 2016) Being that, in turn, Greer & Watson mention that, although Indonesia is recognized for its success in jailing terrorists, these in prison obtain continuous education from a group of agents waiting for them to arrive in jails, convicts unhappy with the government on duty ready to recruit, to which they also mention that ‘‘Indonesian prison reform is urgently needed to prevent the spread of terrorism in Indonesia.’’ (Greer & Watson, 2016)

To this, the answer is that it is sensible to contribute more capital in terms of interrupting the cycles of radicalization, since the greater the investment in this issue, the less possibility there will be of taking criminals for the position of terrorists.

Regarding the above, ASEAN as an organization should and needs to “develop local restorative approaches based on data to prevent and rehabilitate radicalization” (Greer & Watson, 2016),

An example of this is the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore, which was founded with the aim of rehabilitating those who were detained from Jemaah Islamiya, however, since the potential of the group was observed, the activity expanded to also promote in dialogue sessions the discourse about extremism, the organization was also in charge of carrying out “community participation in schools, mosques and online communities.”

As for Singapore, to counteract extremism, the issue should be opened to the population to make joint commitments, this is because, in terms of efforts to counter terrorism, two of the strongest allies are within ASEAN, These being “Two of the world's largest Muslim mass movements, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, for example, have launched programs to counter ISIS narratives.” (Greer & Watson, 2016) In the case of NU, after the attacks carried out in January 2015, the UN group carried out a movement on social networks, in which they invited the population to denounce the actions of ISIS with the hashtag #KamiTidakTakut which translates #WeAreNotAfraid (We are not afraid). In other cases such as the anti-terrorist organization Quilliam advocate, they carry out dissemination against the visions of these groups, they also viralize against reflective narratives that they take as weaknesses to their arguments, with which, in addition, they carry out campaigns segmenting their interests under demographic data seeking to reach in the most ideal and specific way to each target audience, this is a crucial element, since, it is known that within ASEAN there are a large number of different communities with diverse populations, if not, populations simply will not accept the narrative presented to them.

The response of some experts regarding both public and private efforts against radicalization was that the dialogue and exchange of both intelligence and efficient practices be enacted under the governments of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, surveys Jointly with the objective of data collection, the financing of research aimed at the analysis of vulnerable populations and based on this, generate policies that “work to alleviate the underlying complaints. that make extremism seem like a powerful alternative.” (Greer & Watson, 2016)

For Indonesia, its appeal by Islamic terrorist groups is due to “weak central government control and considerable social and political instability and its overwhelming Muslim population.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) This is because from the crisis that Asia suffered during 1997 to 1999, the government gradually lost control, in addition to the “replacement of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998, which had been in power since 1965, with a more central government. democratic but weaker.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

The former president of Indonesia, Megawati, publicly presented two quite disparate positions, since he announced that he was committed to condemning anti-American violence, to which he also mentioned that it was within his margin of action, to protect the assets of the American population, However, his second position on the subject was to warn that he is against violence and military campaigns carried out by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The object of religious parity between Muslims and Christians, several radical Islamists focused on isolated and remote areas of state control in the country, to which “apparently, some with al-Qaeda connections.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

The situation is complex in that although the majority of Indonesian Islam is moderate, the fundamentalist groups that not only grew in influence in vulnerable areas, have managed to take advantage of the problems that the country presents. These extremist groups carry out “separatist movements in various provinces” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003), to which must be added the economic recession suffered after the Asian financial crisis, the constant power struggle by the Christian and Muslim ideologies of the country's elite, as in Maluku or Java, have Indonesia in a perfect setting For terrorist groups to disturb state control, extremist groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Front of Islamic Defenders have been in charge of this, which according to intelligence, received “assistance from elements within the Indonesian Army (TNI) to organize, secure weapons and transport locals throughout the Indonesian archipelago.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

As for the most radical groups, they have sought the specific adoption of Islamic law (Sharia) as a benefit to the country, which, taking politics for example, in the 1999 Indonesian elections, “only a small minority of Muslim parties favored radical Islamic agendas, and overall Muslim parties obtained less than a fifth of the vote.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003), although, in order to do this, it is necessary to connote the parity differences to the American policy against Islamic terrorism, since, thanks to the pressure on Megawati imparted by Washington, the tripartite theorization of the negative political resonance regarding the American measures is presented, the anger of extremist Islamists and the concern of secular patriotic Indonesians or nationalists attached to conservatism.

Regarding Indonesia and the United States, cooperation against terrorism must be based on areas of direct intervention, which are “targeted assistance to the police and security officials, prosecutors, legislators, immigration officials, bank regulators.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) To which it is arrived that the bilateral programs between the United States and Indonesia to face the terrorism are based on: 12 million dollars in order to form within the national police an antiterrorist unit, 4.9 million dollars to train both the police and security officers between 2001 and 2003 to face terrorism, training financial intelligence to improve conditions and parameters to counter money laundering, while in turn, financial analysts were trained to deal with to the terrorist strategies and exchange of these analysts with the American Treasury Department, training and help in creating an efficient system for border

security and finally generating educational scholarships to train in the fight against terrorism “and issues related to the Indonesian army.” (State Department Fact Sheet, 2003)

The Philippines offered both ports and airports at the disposal of naval vessels and the post-9/11 American air force, given that the Philippines totally rejected the position of fundamentalist Islam and thanks to this an agreement was reached between the then President of the Philippines Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Bush in which what would become an important action of deploying military forces in the southern Philippines, the most conflictive area of the country to jointly fight the Philippine army against Abu Sayyaf, was presented. In addition to this, both presidents launched an announcement on November 20, 2001 in which it was presented that a contribution of \$ 92 million would be given for military assistance and “\$ 55 million in economic aid from the United States for the Muslim regions in the Philippines during 2001 and 2002.” (Mufson, 2001)

Phase 1 of the US support to the Philippines in terms of cooperation, was based on 1,200 soldiers of whom 150 were special forces, these were deployed between January 2002 and July of the same year, out of this 300 US Navy troops were deployed.

Phase 2 was about “training 16 light infantry companies by the end of 2003 for use against Muslim insurgents and the NPA. Funding would come from a \$ 25 million military aid package.” (Villanueva & Pareno, 2002) Even with this, the two governments in the midst of negotiating for military aid, concluded that in phase 2 “except for aerial surveillance, US military personnel. USA He would not participate in the intensified Philippine military campaign against Abu Sayyaf on Jolo Island south of Basilian.” (Villanueva & Pareno, 2002) Although the object of constant attacks by Abu Sayyaf, the defense state arranged to carry out a longer assistance program in the Philippines, the object of this in the pentagon was announced a plan for which the United States would send 350 special forces soldiers to working together with the army and navy in Jolo, an additional 400 troops were also sent to Zamboanga. “Positioned on the Jolo high seas would be a navy task force of 1,000 US Marines and 1,300 navy equipped with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier aircraft.” (Graham, 2003)

Before the end of 2003, the administrations of both countries, in this case led by Bush and Arroyo, “decided to suspend the plan and renegotiate the rules for the participation of US forces.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) Later on May 19, 2003, in the midst of Arroyo's visit to Washington, the United States “announced a new program of \$ 65 million for the training of various AFP battalions (and \$ 30 million for financial aid in Mindanao), and designated the Philippines as an important non-NATO Ally.” (Non-Nato, 2003) President Bush on the visit hinted at the Philippines as “a rock of stability in the Pacific and pledged the United States to provide technical assistance, expertise and funding to help modernize the Philippine Army.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

Finally, they ended with the affirmation that both the United States and the Philippines remain in the joint objective of bringing justice to Abu Sayyaf and “dismantling Jemaah Islamiya.” (George W. Bush, 2003)

For Singapore, the situation was simpler as far as the United States is concerned, as it has always been ahead in dealing with terrorism in Southeast Asia. Even with this, Singapore at the time was concerned that its hegemony as a “financial and logistics center of the region” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003) would be threatened., to which the uncertainty on the part of Singapore is that “important port facilities and other important objectives remain vulnerable.” (Szep, 2003) Since, in 2001, an attack was carried out against the cells of the members of Jemaah Islamiya, this given that after arresting some of those who were suspected of being part of radical Islamist organizations, they provided “detailed information about Jemaah Islamiya and the structure Qaeda Recruitment Methods and Strategies.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

Other important actions taken by Singapore were tightening controls and surveillance on financial movements, increasing “the number of patrols in the Malacca Strait and increasing intelligence cooperation with regional countries and the United States.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

In addition, in June 2002, the United States and Singapore entered into an agreement to allow US customs officials to conduct both intrusive and non-intrusive inspections of cargo containers destined for this, in addition, immigration control also It would be controlled with destiny to the United States by the same, this to prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks, smuggling (at that time the smuggling of weapons of destruction was feared) and illegal trade. Both of these measures would be the basis for the program carried out by the United States U.S. Customs and Border Protection or C-TPAT, which would later provide the basis for the global OAS Authorized Economic Operator.

In the case of Malaysia, the one who was Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who was openly “promoter of non-violent Muslim causes” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

made a public criticism of the Islamic groups participating in the 9/11 attack, the United States thanks to the determinism against the public disgust against these anti-American groups, Mahathir was invited to the White House where he had some meetings with Bush, object of these meetings in 2002, the “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the fight against terrorism was signed.” (Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, & Vaughn, 2003)

Thanks to this document, the bases for the joint declaration between the United States and ASEAN were made at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in August 2002.

In conclusion, US policies worked in the short term to generate a public image of a successful victory against terror in the region, however, real efforts to counter the bases by which new members are developed for these organizations were not worked by part of the United States.

“The dialogue in ASEAN has not brought the positions between the United States and the Muslim countries of the region closer, but has only strengthened ties with countries with which good relations already existed, such as Thailand and Singapore.” (Malacalza, 2004)

Tackling the structural sources of terrorism in Southeast Asia requires reform by ASEAN, not by action only realized by American military operations.

The United States can help through organizations to strengthen relations between ASEAN members as it did in its participation in the ARF, it can participate as an intermediary in joint policies for cross-border control and principles promoting organisms between Islam and Christians.

### **2.3 New threats to the horizon: Participation of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Southeast Asia**

“As summarized by Thayer, there are at least three general approaches to analyzing terrorism in Southeast Asia: an international approach, a regional approach, and a country-specific approach, although there is some overlap between the approaches.” (Hafidz, 2009)

Both Abu Sayyaf and other Islamist groups in Southeast Asia made cooperation and connections with Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda even before the fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, it is since that time that “Al-Qaida has allegedly established a base in the southern Philippines, which served as a training ground for Afghan alumni and other Islamist militant groups” (Hafidz, 2009)

of which it is known what the activities to be carried out by these were concentrated in the country, however, it was not strange to observe them operating in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. This was discovered by the Singapore authorities shortly before they found an entire intertwined Jemaah Islamiya network. This was crucial given that the Jemaah Islamiya was classified as an ally of Al Qaeda which operated in the Pan-Islamic caliphate in which a large number of the Muslim population is located, being the majority of the population, in this area is Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten that in Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand there is still a minority of the Muslim population, it is an important minority.

As for politics and Islam in Southeast Asia, after the conceptual change to Indonesia to become democracy, political Islam was raised, to which violent and non-violent forms are attributed, to which the question is born? Where do the projectors of Islam politics in Indonesia come from? Because after the US attacks in Afghanistan, it became known that the Taliban fleeing the area were reaching areas where there were counterparts to their philosophy, this place was Southeast Asia, a sector from which they intended to carry out retaliatory operations against the United States, thus using the region to make new settlements and increase insecurity in the area. “Other parts of the region seemed to corroborate fears that the Taliban threat has now been contained, Southeast Asia becoming the forefront of "new" Al-Qaida terrorism.” (Hafidz, 2009)

The roots that generate terrorism and the effect of this, allow it not to be so far-fetched to assimilate what is in line with the objectives of what is known as the Second Front, since, by intermingling the collateral effects caused by an extremist population with a desire for revenge towards the United States, a population that is poor and vulnerable to the change in the established opinion, al-Qaeda has seen a refuge for its networks in Southeast Asia and



provides strength to the objective of transferring democracy to other scenarios, overthrowing it and finally replacing it with caliphate.

In addition to this, the scenario presents notorious junctures, being what, both Western culture and Islam are mixed, to which the widespread influence posed by US foreign policy in Southeast Asia makes a clash of cultural projections both between the part close to the West and Islam. This is also reflected in politics, since several politicians barely took office, seeking to align themselves with Washington, which in some way prevented the free development of these biased groups of Al Qaeda, but among mixed with the fundamentalist population of the region.

For security in the region, there should be a vision of what al Qaeda is inside of not only international terrorism, but that it brings to “practically all the militant Islamist groups operating in the region” (Hafidz, 2009) since, only in Indonesia, according to Hafidz, “half of the radical Islamist groups in the region and the site of a series of major terrorist attacks are located”, to which the security experts of the region and the Competent entities to verify its security, catalog terrorist groups such as the

*Indonesian Mujahidin Council, Laskar Jihad (Army of Religious Struggle), Laskar Jundullah (Army of God), Laskar Mujahidin (Army of Religious Combatants), Front of Islamic Defenders, all in Indonesia, Gerakan al-Maunah (Aid Movement Divina) of Malaysia and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Association of Religious Fighters of Malaysia); and Thailand's Pattani United Liberation Organization, as terrorist affiliates of Al-Qaida (Hafidz, 2009)*

Although, beyond the assertion made by the security experts who make the above mention, other reports give the perspective that, although not all, the vast majority of “the militant groups are of local origin and emerge in response to the complaints. and local conditions.” (Hafidz, 2009) Similarly, other visions allude to what in Southeast Asia, the object of its “historical, geographical, political, economic and social composition, provides an environment conducive to the co-optation and penetration of Al Qaeda by local Islamist groups” (Hafidz, 2009), in this way, the variable of the capacity of religious influence carried out in countries of the Middle East to empower the change of perspective of Islam in Southeast Asia, from a more political perspective to a more direct change in terms of the call on the population, would be taken.

Beyond the visions that are raised about the influence of Al Qaeda with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, countries such as Indonesia argue that these methodical changes in the structure and object of local terrorist groups is not due to the relationship with a house base in Afghanistan or derived cells, but rather that it is considered the object of regional



situations and therefore it should be resolved with local democracy, since, looking sharply at the history and contexts through which politics in the region has gone through, These are largely the cause of the nuanced perspective on terrorism and, according to the high command, it is not due to conjectural influence. This, given that influence and determinism only in the application of alliances or correlation with Al Qaeda, would seriously modify and “misrepresent the root causes of the problem, which are, among others, poverty, injustice and authoritarianism.” (Hafidz, 2009)

Although the Indonesian high command specifically does not rule out the “the existence of transnational terrorist networks in the region and the possibility of a link between local militant Islamist groups with Al-Qaida” (Hafidz, 2009), The fact that all radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia have strict links with Al Qaeda is questioned.

It is necessary to specify this position regarding the connection of international terrorist networks in Southeast Asia in order to take a position under them and under globalization.

Regarding globalization, terrorism “has contributed to generalizing organized crime: terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons, money laundering” (Ballesteros, 2018)

that directly affect the bilateral connections, in this case, the transnational relations between the members of ASEAN, since well for the members of the organization the main commercial axes are with their relatives in the area (Other members of ASEAN), this can largely affected by terrorism as terrorist-related business activities still remain “active succulent sources of finance, all stemming from a compendium of illicit activities on the ground that it controls” (Isac, 2016) this is subject of poor customs, border and quality controls in supply chains by the region's joint policies.

When speaking of a terrorist group, reference is made to the fact that, from its central objectives, it has the political guideline, on which the operation is largely based, since the political purpose in question of territory allows the structuring of the power. This is due to disgust in the face of individualized political scenarios by country, such as in the case of Abu Sayyaf or Jemaah Islamiya, which position the cycle of radicalization at the roots given to bad practices by the government, such as low investments in neighboring poor areas. and to state authoritarianism.

Effect of the international position on what the fight against terrorism obtained. The international community was successful in its victory, however, ISIS has not been completely defeated, it gave itself the task of withdrawing and mobilizing its conjectural effect towards the area in which it has been since its general independence until today, an effect of struggles for religious schemes, to which they can thus take him to other parts of the globe and with it, the goal of “continuing to gain legitimacy and popularity, both of which he will need when

his last strongholds collapse in Syria and Iraq.’’ (Isac, 2016) Being that now the objective of these is in addition to Russia, to which, passing from the cold Russian lands, following the Indian full of pirates, through the deserts of North Africa to the lush jungles of Southeast Asia, there is no space in the one that cannot appreciate the division or dispersion to which it could be considered as irrepressible.

Thus, terrorism is reinforced by the non-organization of the states, taking advantage of the variables of the culture, community and political focus of some states, seeking to take their boom in them.

Object of the weakening of the central axis of Al Qaeda when its leader Osama Bin Laden was eliminated and the loss of the territory that was controlled by Daesh in Iraq and cannot lead one to think that terrorism is losing spaces, since it is now notes a ‘‘proliferation of international jihadism groups and franchises that, to varying degrees, and more or less directed, coordinated or inspired by the organization or spirit of Al Qaeda and Daesh, continue to project their barbarism over wide areas.’’ (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación, s.f.)

To follow the steps or foresee the actions of Daesh, it is necessary to start from the relationship they have with groups around the globe, in this case with local groups in Southeast Asia, with which the influence links are aimed at establishing the jihadist caliphate. According (Tolosa, 2019), the level of proximity posed by terrorist connections and cultural variation shows why, with some al-Qaeda organizations, it has become ‘‘its regional subsidiaries or franchises, while many others have not gone beyond showing their sympathy or ideological affinity.’’

Well, ‘‘Islam is a rational culture that extends over three continents in a coherent way and with a valuable cultural heritage’’ (Bustinzá, 2005), This generates a set of cultural measures, within the connection between states, with which, although a cultural wealth increases, also added to the poverty in certain sectors of the region, it drives the extremism of fundamentalist Islamists to fall victim to calls from terrorist groups in the area. ‘‘Tan argues that Al-Qaida's claim for co-optation and penetration into regional local Islamist groups is disputed by the fact that they have pre-dated Al-Qaida and arose in response to local complaints and conditions.’’ (Hafidz, 2009)

Following the same guidelines, it could not be shown that the attacks carried out by the Jemaah Islamiya in Bali were related or supported by Al Qaeda.

For the teacher (T.Sidel, 2012) the coverage that was given and was being given to terrorist acts in Southeast Asia ‘‘focuses on the description, rather than the explanation, of the events rather than the causes. ’’ (T.Sidel, 2012) Equally, Sidel (T.Sidel, 2012) mentions that ‘‘the Islamist forces in Southeast Asia are in retreat: terrorist violence reflects frustration at the reduction of political influence, not a rising tide of Islamization.’’ To which he concludes

that, punctually reviewing Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and the southern part of Thailand, which was the focus of terrorist activities, are on the decline in terrorist attacks and in the case of Indonesia, in a total decline.

The subject of a careful analysis, Professor “showed that, in fact, the period between 200 and 2007 characterized a significant weakening of the radical Islamist movement, tending to the decline of violence in the name of Islam in the Southeast.” (Hafidz, 2009)

For common effects in the three philosophies of thought, there are 3 trends, being these that there really is a transnational link between the fundamentalist Islamist groups in the region and those networks that have already been classified as international. Even in groups that only operate locally, they are known to have connections both regionally and internationally “from the common dislike for perceived pro-Israel and anti-Islam foreign policies. USA Until he was inspired by the pan-regional idea of the statehood of the JI and the pan-Islamic ideology of Al-Qaida.” (Hafidz, 2009) It is also necessary to take into account the premise that in a globalized world, influence can be perceived from any area, as a local force can have some external influence in any scenario.

Considering the above, for (Archarya & Archarya, 2007) the threats of terrorism in the region cannot be isolated to an isolated standard, given that, subject to conjectural policies and measures for centuries in the region, terrorism in Southeast Asia is understood under the framework of “a local phenomenon and global” to what (Tan, 2007) it hints when mentioning that “the new terrorism exists together with the old terrorism that represents the ethnic, religious, political, economic and social complaints that preceded September 11, 2001, in which local dynamics play out. the most dominant factor.”

As for what Southeast Asia brings to the Daesh movement, it takes that “up to 1,500 have traveled from the region to fight for the so-called caliphate.” (Douglas, 2016) This was mentioned in April 2013 when the new policies of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were announced. The most relevant problem regarding Southeast Asia with respect to the above is that those who went to the Middle East to fight for the position of extremist Islam, as the situation in Iraq and Syria deteriorated, began to return to their lands of origin, in this Southeast Asia case, to which some “seek the next place with a weak rule of law to settle and fight. Others will return with the intention of mixing again with society. In any case, they will return with new and dangerous skills, ideas and contacts.” (Douglas, 2016)

Now, Southeast Asia in 2016 became a region of tensions in terms of terrorism, since, after the establishment of ISIS in the region, “multiple radical groups and clergy throughout Southeast Asia, mainly in the Philippines and Indonesia declared allegiance to the newly formed caliphate.” (Greer & Watson, 2016) Following this, it is stated that surveys carried out by Pew showed that he “11% of the Malays are sympathetic to the cause of ISIS.” (Greer & Watson, 2016) However they state that the population of Southeast Asia, “represent only

a fraction of ISIS foreign fighters, it is estimated that close to 800 Southeast Asians are in Iraq and Syria supporting ISIS ... enough ... to help integrate them into the ranks of ISIS.” (Greer & Watson, 2016)

For Southeast Asia, it is important in terms of history what has developed culturally in the countries, to face terrorism in a cunning but direct way, since, as the object of history in the region, the multiple cultural clashes at the time of the independence of nations and clarifying the migratory and religious processes, it has been found that what could be called a “popular sympathy for radicalism in the region” is happening. (Greer & Watson, 2016). Therefore, the countries must curb at the root, the impulses of the various terrorist groups to generate cultural impacts on Islamic extremist tendencies in the region, being that for this, caution is necessary, an object that will allow, in the light of day, to limit terrorism. radical without further affecting impulses in populations vulnerable to the schemes of Islamist extremists.

ISIS has taken advantage of the need for a traditional approach against terrorism (or the absence thereof) in which there are military actions, policies, imprisonment, public prosecution, and social persecution of terrorists without isolating populations vulnerable to idealism from these perceptions. from ISIS and Al Qaeda, as, “It is important to note that retributive approaches do little to reduce recidivism rates or disrupt the underlying cycles of anger and grievance that are central to radicalization.” (Greer & Watson, 2016)

“Scholars, policy makers, and activists are ramping up counter-terrorism efforts under the broad (if not banal) umbrella of "winning hearts and minds.” (Greer & Watson, 2016)

being that the people who are in favor of reintegrating those who were enlisted in the camps of any of these groups, conclude that in terms of radicalization, the transformation of the community into an extremist ideology, is the axis central to the recruitment gear of terrorist groups, to which, the victory against them, would be focusing real and prudent attention at the root of the cycles of radicalization, to which it is necessary to take the roots that they use to adopt popularity and relevance in the population, disrupting it and counteracting these schemes in order not only to bring down the recruitment scheme, but also to influence the population to look down on and totally reject the extremist position of these terrorist groups. Although, it is essential to understand that these strategies called “hearts and minds” have a real impact in the long term, for which a joint effort is required between the motivations that the community generates for the population, the economic situation, the personal inclinations and the culture of the local environment to which the person is influenced. In addition, when the propaganda that contradicts the position of these ways of thinking are carried out by people who benefit from the enactment of these, such as the government or state entities, they are not only frowned upon, but could generate “fundamental grievances of improperly.” (Greer & Watson, 2016).

As for Southeast Asia, the rapprochement of these groups is important, since, “Islam in Morocco is not the same as in Indonesia, Senegal or Saudi Arabia.” (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos , 2015)

As for the networks belonging to the Islamic State in addition to South or Central Asia, there are a number of Islamic insurgent groups among which are those who swore allegiance to the Islamic State in the Philippines and Indonesia. In addition, you have those who are active “active militants for the Islamic State in Malaysia, southern Thailand” (Isac, 2016)

In the Philippines, a mirror of high poverty occurs in the jungle areas of the south of the country, in which, the archipelagos serve as an insurgent group to which the Islamic State is listed as allies or referents in the area, with Abu Sayyaf being its main target, in addition to the Abu Sayyaf group, is Ansar al-Jilafa, Jemaah Islamiya, Moro Liberation Front, “Islamic Freedom Fighters from Bangsamoro, Movement for Justice of Bangsamoro, Marakat al Ansar Brigade, Katiba Ansar al Sharia Brigade and Mujahideen of the Islamic Movement.” (Private Company Intelcenter Background, 2016)

In Indonesia, although it seems that anti-terrorism policies are bearing fruit and influencing the population and terrorist groups, it is understood that the country returns to a context in which the opening to new regions by the Islamic State affected, since, in Indonesia this group already has the loyalty of “Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid, the Mujahideen of Indonesia Timor and Jamaah Ansar Khilafah Daulah Nusantara.” (Private Company Intelcenter Background, 2016)

As for the leadership of the pro-Islamic State fractions, there is the situation that in the provinces destined for how Indonesia and the Philippines “would be delayed until there was a single leader in each of those regions who could communicate directly with Al Baghdadi.” (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos , 2015)

“The recent expansion of IS and Al Qaeda injects a new urgency in prevention, both during crises, to stop its radicalization.” (Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islami State , 2016)

In conclusion, ASEAN must focus on the causes of radicalization cycles, otherwise, the variable external to the regional environment regarding terrorism could affect the correct structuring to curb these historical aversions to state authoritarianism.

The causes of terrorism, how well are poverty, authoritarianism, remote and unattended areas of the state, and the decentralization of the population by politics that finally end, generating disgust in the population which considers joining groups what of in some way, they seek to affect the states that rejected them.

More organizations are required to provide information that contributes to moderate Islam and that punishes the fundamentalist.

Joint policies must be carried out between the states in order to face the threat of transnational terrorism.

The states are providing intelligence when confronting terrorist groups, however, no activity is being carried out regarding the roots of this animosity towards the state in question, a situation that is withdrawn in the countries of Southeast Asia without discriminating culture, history or geography.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1 Conclusions**

ASEAN has an excellent opportunity to confront and counter efforts to generate separatist and extremist visions among the population. Although the Islamic State is focusing its attention on Syria and Iraq, the loss in that scenario may lead the group to generate decentralized network measures in which they would spread across the globe. However, the Islamic State poses a threat, it is not the only or the most important concern in the region, being that, the Jemaah Islamiya, the Abu Sayyaf group and the MILF.

If governments really want to face terrorism in the region, they need to carry out policies with both public and private ones to promote Moderate Islam, being what, the Fundamentalist or extremist is rejected, to which the measures in Regarding sentencing, deterrence, interconnection (Greater border controls) and investing mainly in the restoration of vulnerable populations in order to break into the cycles of radicalization.

More restoration and integration groups should be encouraged and how do they mention (Greer & Watson, 2016) “Singapore's RRG remains the only one of its kind in Asia; Such restorative approaches are urgently needed.”

ASEAN still lacks actions to mention the end or approach of terrorism in the region, given that together with the United States the objective was to develop legal capacity to combat extremist Islamic groups, even with this, each time by collecting the most recent information , it is observed that terrorism in Southeast Asia is maintained more as a regional than global effect, given that both the roots of terrorism and the evolution of it are due to "non-traditional security problems" to which They include topics such as poverty, class difference, and authoritarianism.

For the real effects of ASEAN policy and cooperation, regional policy is not in a position to efficiently address the local causes of the problem, “since ASEAN cooperation is dictated by the principle of preservation of sovereignty with its clear distinction between national and regional domains.” (Hafidz, 2009) but, as a result of the facilitation to do business, the economic opening and the gradual opening of the borders, no country is totally isolated to the “transnational link between crime and terrorism.” (Hafidz, 2009) To which, when observing the joint policy and the principle of preservation of sovereignty, lies the effect that it demonstrates because, at least in the near future, it will not be possible to determine the quantity and capacity in collective policies to face the roots of terrorism in as for joint efforts and adequately and effectively.

However, when glimpsing the situation in the long term, it does not sound far-fetched when assimilating that when an ASEAN community is established, it will see in it, at least a

modification or reinterpretation of the principle of sovereignty that it manages within the pillars of ASEAN. To which at that time the environment can be effectively resolved with respect to the radicalization cycle, but until then, actions could be taken against terrorism and its groups, however, the problem will not be solved since the causes of it would be seen intact.

Are the measures carried out by the regional policy effective against terrorism? And even more, are they sustainable over time?



### **3.2 Recommendations**

By observing the causes of terrorism, it was possible to understand both the history of terrorism, as well as the structural change to its definition, to which finally, it could be understood that these as objectives seek a social, political and economic restructuring according to what that for them is beneficial and necessary for the population, it should not be forgotten that thanks to terrorists in France led by Robespierre, the modern state model on which the political organization of most nations is based was declared, in addition, thanks the human rights charter was decreed to them.

During the course of the investigation, it was determined that really attacking terror with terror (Disregarding the fact that the definition of terrorism was originally referring to the state against the people and was later modified to benefit it) does not succeed in remedying its roots. since 100 blows to the leaves of terrorist groups are no more fruitful than just a touch to the root of social disgust.

Perhaps the object of communication between the state and the community in a more open way, without arbitration, it can finally be understood that, if the objective is to remedy extremist terrorism by Daesh or other organizations with similar objectives around the world, it is more plausible, to permeate the population with moderate knowledge so that the fundamentalist comes to be seen as a reluctant and putrid vision of the real objectives of Islam. Terrorists seek to obtain support from the population by showing the state gaps and attacking based on the weaknesses they know could generate disgust among the most vulnerable population. What would happen if the state uses mass communication to make these groups see themselves as argumentatively weak and Thanks to this, take the support of the population?

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